Journal of Food Law & Policy
Volume 16

Number 1

Article 8

2020

"A Glass of Milk Strengthens a Nation." Law Development, and
China's Dairy Tale
Xiaoqian Hu
University of Arizona

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jflp
Part of the Chinese Studies Commons, Cultural History Commons, Economic History Commons, Food
and Drug Law Commons, Labor History Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Hu, X. (2020). "A Glass of Milk Strengthens a Nation." Law Development, and China's Dairy Tale. Journal of
Food Law & Policy, 16(1). Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jflp/vol16/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Journal of Food Law & Policy by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please
contact scholar@uark.edu.

Volume Sixteen
Number One
Spring 2020

“A GLASS OF MILK STRENGTHENS A NATION.”
LAW, DEVELOPMENT, AND CHINA’S DAIRY TALE
Xiaoqian Hu

A PUBLICATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS SCHOOL OF LAW

“A Glass of Milk Strengthens a Nation.”
Law, Development, and China’s Dairy Tale
Xiaoqian Hu*
Abstract
Historically, China was a soybean nation and not a dairy
nation. Today, China has become the world’s largest dairy importer
and third largest dairy producer, and dairy has surpassed soybeans in
both consumption volume and sales revenue.
This article
investigates the legal, political, and socioeconomic factors that drove
this transformation, and building upon fieldwork in two Chinese
counties, examines the transformation’s socioeconomic impact on
China’s several hundred million farmers and ex-farmers and political
impact on the Chinese regime. The article makes two arguments.
First, despite changes of times and political regimes, China’s dairy
tale is a tale about chasing the dreams of progress, modernization,
and national rejuvenation. Second, and more tentatively, China’s
recent moves toward hard authoritarianism have global roots and can
be interpreted in part as political reactions to the systemic job losses
and social dislocation in rural-agricultural China after its embrace of
globalization.
I. Introduction
Historically, China was not a dairy nation. The majorityHan Chinese did not drink milk or eat cheese or yogurt.1 As a matter
of fact, studies have found that Chinese people have very high levels
* Xiaoqian Hu is an associate professor of law at the University of Arizona James
E. Rogers College of Law. I would like to thank the University of Arizona for
hosting the symposium and the symposium participants for their helpful questions
and comments. Special thanks go to Andy Coan, David Gantz, Shi-Ling Hsu,
Michael Pappas, Justin Pidot, Sergio Puig, and Andrew Woods, whose insights
improved this article tremendously; and to Jessica Eisen and Erum Sattar, whose
friendship, support, and inspiration were essential to the completion of this article. I
would also like to thank Harvard Law School East Asian Legal Studies and Harvard
University Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies for funding my fieldwork; and
William Alford, Martha Fineman, and Duncan Kennedy for useful feedback on the
initial conceptualization of the fieldwork. I am grateful to Collette Cox and the staff
of the Journal of Food Law & Policy for their terrific editorial assistance. I owe the
deepest debt of gratitude to the hundreds of interlocutors in rural China, whose
participation, generosity, and open-mindedness made this article possible.
1 Françoise Sabban, The Taste for Milk in Modern China (1865-1937), in FOOD
CONSUMPTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: ESSAYS IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF FOOD IN
HONOUR OF JACK GOODY 184 (Jakob A. Klein & Anne Murcott eds., 2014) (noting
both milk’s cultural signification as a “barbarian food” and a lack of ordinary milk
consumption in traditional China).
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of lactose malabsorption.2 On the other hand, China has always been
a soybean nation. It was the first nation to cultivate soybeans and, to
this day, it remains the largest nation of soybean consumption. 3
Soybeans pervade the traditional Han diet—from soy oil, soy sauce,
and tofu (a product so closely related to China that even the West
calls it by its Chinese name) to bean sprouts, bean paste, and various
fermented products.4 If one had to identify a “milk” in the traditional
Chinese diet, it would be doujiang (豆浆)—a hot, often sweetened
breakfast drink made from soybeans.5 In the Chinese language, dou
means beans, and since soybean is the bean for the Han Chinese, dou
implies soybeans.6 Jiang refers to a thick liquid, often from a plant.7
As China historian Jia-Chen Fu documents, renaming doujiang
“soymilk” was part of a deliberate nation-building effort by
progressive intellectuals, social reformers, emerging entrepreneurs,
and government officials of the Republican era (1912-1949).8
Today, while China continues to be the world’s largest
soybean consumer,9 it has also become the world’s third largest dairy
2

See, e.g., Wang Yongfa et al., Prevalence of Primary Adult Lactose Malabsorption
in Three Populations of Northern China, 67 HUM. GENETICS 103, 103 (1984).
3 Leqing Zhiku (乐晴智库) [Leqing Think Tank], Dounai Hangye: Zhongguo
Dounai Xiaoliang Quanqiu Diyi, Shichang Guimo Jin Baiyi (豆奶行业：中国豆奶
销量全球第一，市场规模近百亿) [Soymilk Industry: Chinese Soymilk Sales No.
1 in the World, Market Size Approaches 10 Billion Yuan], SINA CAIJING TOUTIAO
(SINA 财经头条) [SINA FIN. HEADLINES] (July 4, 2017), https://cj.sina.com.cn/article
/detail/5160876646/307624.
4 See Soy Story: The History of the Soybean, EATING CHINA, https://www.eatingchin
a.com/articles/soystory.htm (last updated Dec. 12, 2019) [hereinafter Soy Story]; see
also Soy Products, EATING CHINA, https://www.eatingchina.com/articles/soyproduc
ts.htm (last updated January 13, 2020).
5 Doujiang was likely invented in the early Han Dynasty (202 BC-220 AD), but did
not become part of the Chinese diet until mid- to late Qing (1644-1912). JIA-CHEN
FU, THE OTHER MILK: REINVENTING SOY IN REPUBLICAN CHINA 17 (2018).
6 See Soy Story, supra note 4.
7 Id.
8 See FU, supra note 5, at 109–28 (discussing the rebranding of “doujiang” into
“soymilk”); see also infra Part II (providing more information on this piece of
history).
9 FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select the
“Crops and livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “Select All”
in the countries field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select
“Soybeans” in the items field; select the most recent year; click “Show Data”). A
caveat is in order. This article cites statistics from numerous sources, including
international organizations, government agencies of the United States and China,
non-governmental organizations, and researchers. Data collection raises concerns
about accuracy and representativeness. Such concerns are particularly acute when
the data is collected by governmental agencies in China and no external mechanisms
are available to verify their reliability. I plead that readers interpret the data cited in
this article as rough (at times very rough) and rebuttable guides to help grasp the
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producer,10 and the world’s largest importer of dairy products, dairy
cows, and hay and alfalfa.11 Most significantly, dairy has surpassed
soybeans—by large margins—in both consumption volume and
sales revenue. 12 The relative decline of soybeans in the
contemporary Chinese diet does not mean a decline of soybean use,
however. As a matter of fact, soybeans have transformed from a
human food to predominantly an input for industrial production of
meat, mostly pork—a highly valued, rarely consumed luxury food in
traditional China but a dinner table essential in contemporary
China.13
How did this dietary transformation happen? How does it
affect dairy and soybean farmers in China? What are its international
ramifications, or is it a result, at least in part, of international forces?
What, if any, connection does it have with the worldwide resurgence
of globalization discontentment, and of populism and
authoritarianism, or with the recent moves toward (or return to) “hard
authoritarianism” in China? 14 Last, but not least, how does law
feature in this picture?
macro- and micro-level socioeconomic changes that are taking place in China and
that have been observed by researchers and other analysts, myself included.
10 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DAIRY: WORLD MARKETS AND TRADE 13 (July 2019),
https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usdaesmis/files/5t34sj56t/3f462h141/p8419020t/dairy.pdf.
11 Zhongguo Naiye Xiehui (中国奶业协会) [China Dairy Association], Zhongguo
de Naiye Baipi Shu: Zhongguo Naiye Jiben Qingkuang he Fazhan Xian Zhuang (《
中 国 的 奶 业 》 白 皮 书 ： 中 国 奶 业 基 本 情 况 和 发 展 现 状 ) [White Paper on
“China’s Dairy Industry”: Basic Situation and Development Status of China’s
Dairy Industry], YANGGUANG XUMU WANG (阳 光畜牧网 ) [SUNSHINE ANIMAL
HUSBANDRY NETWORK] (July 13, 2019), http://www.ygsite.cn/show.asp?id=70950.
12 In 2018, Chinese citizens consumed 8.3 kg of soy products and 12.2 kg of dairy
on average. See China Statistical Yearbook 2019: 6-4 Per Capita Consumption of
Major Foods Nationwide, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020). In
2017, the national sales of various soymilk products totaled ¥8.3 billion ($1.2
billion), while the national sales of various dairy products totaled ¥98 billion ($14
billion). See Leqing Zhiku, supra note 3; Zhongshang Qingbao Wang (中商情报
网) [China Business Intelligence Network], 2018 Nian Zhongguo Niunai Shichang
Fenxi ji 2019 Nian Yuce (2018 年中国牛奶市场分析及 2019 年预测) [2018
Analysis and 2019 Predictions of the Chinese Dairy Market], SINA CAIJING TOUTIAO
(SINA 财经头条) [SINA FIN. HEADLINES] (Dec. 27, 2018), https://cj.sina.com.cn/artic
les/view/1245286342/4a398fc600100gxw1.
13 See generally Gustavo de L. T. Oliveira & Mindi Schneider, The Politics of
Flexing Soybeans: China, Brazil, and Global Agroindustrial Restructuring, 43 J.
PEASANT STUD. 167 (2016); see James L. Watson, Meat: A Cultural Biography in
(South) China, in FOOD CONSUMPTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 25, 25–44 (Jakob A.
Klein et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the cultural and spiritual meanings of pork in
traditional Chinese society).
14 China scholars increasingly refer to the recent political changes in China as moves
toward or a return to “hard authoritarianism.” In the absence of a clear definition of
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This article investigates the legal, political, and
socioeconomic factors that drove this transformation. Building upon
fieldwork in two Chinese counties, it also examines the
transformation’s socioeconomic impact on China’s several hundred
million farmers and ex-farmers and political impact on the Chinese
regime.
The article contends that China’s dairy (and dietary) tale
reveals a lesser-known aspect of China’s tale of globalization. While
the West views China as the biggest beneficiary of globalization,
taking advantage of the West’s vast markets to industrialize,
globalization also exposed Chinese farmers to systemic income
insecurity, job losses, social dislocation, and community
disintegration—like farmers in much of the global South and workers
in some manufacturing sectors in the global North.15 As backlashes
against the current global economic regime are empowering
authoritarian leaders around the world, similar forces may also be at
work in China. The economic insecurity and social dislocation
experienced by hundreds of millions of rural Chinese may be
creating a welcoming environment for a political strongman, a more
interventionist industrial policy, and more generally, a turn against
(neo)liberalism.16 Milk helps tell this story.
The rest of this article proceeds to tell the double-sided story
of China’s embrace of a West-dominated global economic order and
the impact of that embrace on China itself—through the lens of milk.
Part II narrates the cultivation of a taste for milk and the subsequent
social history of milk in twentieth-century China. The social origin
“hard authoritarianism,” there is a consensus that soft and hard authoritarianism fall
on a spectrum, with soft implying less and hard implying more state penetration,
coercion, and repression. See Joseph Yu-shek Cheng, Assessing China’s Situation
and Challenges, 5 CONTEMP. CHINA POL. ECON. & STRATEGIC REL. 537, 549 (2019);
see generally CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIANISM
REVIVAL IS UNDERMINING ITS RISE (2018).
15
See, e.g., ISPI, CHINA: CHAMPION OF (WHICH) GLOBALISATION? (Alessia
Amighini ed., 2018), https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/chin
achampion_web_1_0.pdf [hereinafter CHINA: CHAMPION OF (WHICH)
GLOBALISATION?] (providing the view of China as a globalization winner); Branko
Milanovic, Winners of Globalization: The Rich and the Chinese Middle Class.
Losers: The American Middle Class, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/winners-of-globalization-_b_4603454;
see
generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS REVISITED:
ANTI-GLOBALIZATION IN THE ERA OF TRUMP (2018) (for information on job losses
and displacement in the global South and some manufacturing sectors of the global
North); see generally WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED: A
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR AN INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION (Alvaro Santos et al. eds.,
2019) [hereinafter WORLD TRADE & INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED].
16 See infra Section V.
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of milk in China was iconic of the Sino-West relations of the late
Qing and Republican periods (1840-1949), in which the West was a
cohort of materially superior powers ambitious to turn a declining,
inward-looking civilization into a vast market for Western goods.17
To escape imperialism and semi-colonialism, Chinese elites adopted
the Western—particularly the United States (“U.S.”)—notion of
cow’s milk as “nature’s perfect food,” hoping that it would
strengthen the weak body of the Chinese people and, overtime, the
weak body politic of the Chinese nation. 18 In the absence of an
abundance of cow’s milk, doujiang, the native soy drink, was
rebranded as “soymilk” and promoted as the Chinese solution to the
Chinese problem of “backwardness.”19 These ideas about milk are
still prominent today.20
While dairy production and consumption were insignificant
during the Mao era (1949-1976), they achieved remarkable growth
in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of China’s property reform known
as the Household Responsibility System (“HRS”).21 HRS partially
privatized rural landholdings, created one of the most egalitarian
distributions of farmland in the world, and provided a source of
livelihood for hundreds of millions of rural Chinese. 22 The local
histories of milk and soybeans in Mountain County (pseudonym)
illustrate the benefits brought by HRS to rural Chinese citizens.23
The local histories of milk and soybeans in River District
(pseudonym), however, reveal that HRS also created dooming
structural disadvantages for Chinese farmers, which would surface
when their own government turned the country into a vast market for
Western goods.24
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”). Part III describes the complex and conflicting impacts of
the international economic regime on China’s dairy and soybean
farmers after 2001. On the one hand, the abolition of import licenses
17

See infra Section II.A.
See generally Andrea S. Wiley, Milk for “Growth”: Global and Local Meanings
of Milk Consumption in China, India, and the United States, 19 FOOD AND
FOODWAYS 11, 11–33 (2011); Sabban, supra note 1, at 187–94 (explaining the role
of milk in the effort to modernize—often understood as Westernize at the time—
Chinese society during the late Qing and Republican eras); infra Section II.A.
19 See infra Section II.A.
20 See infra Section II.A.
21 See Justin Yifu Lin, The Household Responsibility System Reform in China: A
Peasant’s Institutional Choice, 69 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 410 (1987).
22 See infra Section II.B.
23 See infra Section II.C.i.
24 See infra Section II.C.ii.
18
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and quotas and the drastic reduction in tariffs for dairy and soy
imports allowed larger-scale, more mechanized, and often well
subsidized foreign farmers to flood the Chinese market with their
products.25 Small Chinese farms created by the early reform-era land
regime could not compete.26 Hundreds of millions of farmers (and
their sons and daughters) left home to seek work in cities and
industrial towns as economic migrants. 27 On the other hand, the
same international economic regime has allowed China to expand its
manufacturing and urban economy, absorbing much of the excess
labor in agriculture and raising living standards for the vast majority
of rural (and certainly, urban) Chinese families.28
Part IV analyzes the Chinese state’s industrial policy
responses to problems created by market liberalization. Facing the
pushing and pulling effects of the international economic order as
well as China’s own demographic shifts and resource constraints, the
Chinese state has been aggressively restructuring China’s
agricultural economy since the mid-2000s through legal and
financial means. A core component of the restructuring is, once
again, property reform―but this time to scale up and mechanize
agricultural production, and in this process, destroy the highly
egalitarian, “every rural family is a farm” model created by HRS.29
The local iterations of the new reform in Mountain County and River
District reveal a stark contrast: where there are more trade-inflicted
agricultural job losses, there is more drastic, statist, and paternalistic
industrial policy to restructure the outcompeted agricultural sector.
Part V situates China’s recent political moves toward hard
authoritarianism within the global context of increasing discontent
See Trade, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animalproducts/dairy/trade/ (last updated Mar. 24, 2020); see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
EIB-136, CHINA’S GROWING DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS (2014). See also
George Frisvold, The U.S. Dairy Industry in the 20th and 21st Century, 16 J. FOOD
L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Dec. 2020) (examining government support programs for
dairy farmers and the dairy industry’s transformation from small scale and little
mechanization to ever-larger scale and ever-higher mechanization in the past one
hundred years in the U.S.).
26 Lin, supra note 21; see infra Part III.
27 See Migrant Workers and Their Children, CHINA LAB. BULL. (May 15, 2019),
https://clb.org.hk/content/migrant-workers-and-their-children; infra Part IV.
28 See generally, Chris King-Chi Chan and Pun Ngai, The Making of a New Working
Class? A Study of Collective Actions of Migrant Workers in South China, 198 THE
CHINA Q. 287 (2009) (rural labor employed in manufacturing); Ngai Pun and Huilin
Lu, Neoliberalism, Urbanism and the Plight of Construction Workers in China, 1
WORLD REV. OF POL. ECON. 127 (2010) (rural labor employed in urban
construction).
29 See infra Section IV.
25
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with globalization. It goes beyond dairy and soybeans and looks at
job losses in China’s agricultural sector as a whole. A temporal
comparison of agricultural jobs between 2001 and 2017 reveals the
job loss number to be a staggering 155 million. While this number
can be celebrated as a success story of industrialization and
urbanization, such celebration hides the enormous hardships of
social dislocation, geographical and sectoral transition, and
community disintegration suffered by these 155 million workers and
their families. In response, another component of the Chinese
government’s rural restructuring is establishing social programs to
mitigate socioeconomic decline of ex-farming communities. 30
Fieldwork in Mountain County and River District reveals that these
social protection programs and President Xi Jinping’s anticorruption and anti-poverty campaigns enjoyed strong support
among rural residents. Part V opines that the hardships suffered by
rural Chinese citizens and the subsequent governmental responses
may be creating a populist base receptive to paternalist governance
and a political strongman in defiance of Western, particularly
American, (neo)liberalism.
II. The Social Life of Milk in Twentieth-Century China
A. Cultivate a Chinese Taste for Milk
In a now classic book, sociologist E. Melanie Dupuis
narrates that the American taste for fresh cow’s milk began in the
mid-nineteenth century with industrialization and urbanization, and
fresh cow’s milk was used primarily as a breastmilk substitute for
infants and a food supplement for weaned children.31 If we moved
the time period forward by a couple decades, the same could be said
about the beginning of a Chinese taste for fresh cow’s milk.
Historically, cow’s milk was not part of the Chinese diet. Despite
the Qing rulers’ use of milk as an ingredient in royal cuisine or the
use for making cookies in some coastal regions, the majority-Han
Chinese population considered cow’s milk a “barbarian” food. 32
When cow’s milk was introduced to China, it was promoted
primarily as a nutritious food for infants and children.33

30

See infra Section V.
E. MELANIE DUPUIS, NATURE’S PERFECT FOOD: HOW MILK BECAME AMERICA’S
DRINK 50–51 (2002).
32 Sabban, supra note 1, at 183–185; Yang Zhiyong (杨智勇), Wanqing Shiqi
Zhongguo de Niunai Ye yu Niunai Shichang (晚清时期中国的牛奶业与牛奶市场)
[China’s Dairy Industry and Dairy Markets During the Late Qing Period], 21 J.
CENT. SOUTH UNIV. SOC. SCI. 223, 223 (2015).
33 See infra text accompanying notes 51–54.
31
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However, China’s post-1840 history also made its dairy tale
distinct from that of the U.S. In 1840, Britain invaded China under
the pretext of defending British merchants’ property rights against
the Qing government’s confiscation of opium and prohibition of
opium trade.34 When China lost the war, it agreed in the Treaty of
Nanjing to open up selected ports to allow foreign goods to be sold
in China.35 Foreign merchants, missionaries, and other actors were
allowed to reside in these port cities too, which created a demand for
bovine milk on one hand and permitted the transmission of ideas and
technologies about milk on the other. 36 Dairy operations were
established in or near port cities using low-yield Chinese cattle.37 As
foreigners’ demand for milk exceeded the indigenous supply, higheryield European cows were imported via these trading ports.38
European and American missionaries were instrumental to
the establishment of a Chinese dairy industry. Missionaries brought
European or North American cows to China and hired or taught
Chinese workers to milk cows.39 The first Holstein cows imported
from Europe were raised by a Catholic convent in Shanghai, which
later facilitated the first inter-breeding between Holstein cows and
indigenous cattle.40
Although an interest in milk was initially limited to
foreigners residing in port cities, this would soon change. The first
European milk company, Anglo-Swiss Milk Company, began to sell
condensed milk to China via Hong Kong (which had become a
British colony after the Opium War) in as early as 1874.41 Nestlé,
the other major European milk player at the time, also sold its milk
powder in port cities in China.42

34

See e.g., JULIA LOVELL, THE OPIUM WAR: DRUGS, DREAMS, AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN CHINA (2012).
35 Id. at 223−40 (on the history of the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing).
36 Yang Zhiyong, supra note 32, at 223.
37 Id. at 223–24.
38 Id.; Shao Yishu (邵逸舒), Jiyu Ruye Shiyu de Minguo Shiqi Lanzhou Chengshi
Xiandaihua Tezheng ( 基 于 乳 业 视 域 的 民 国 时 期 兰 州 城 市 现 代 化 特 征 )
[Characteristics of the Modernization of Republican-Era Lanzhou City Through the
Lens of the Dairy Industry], 30 J. ZHANGJIAKOU VOC. & TECH. C. 17, 17 (2017).
39 Yang Zhiyong, supra note 32, at 223–45; Geng Lei (耿磊), Ruye yu Chengshi
Jindaihua: Yi Kangzhan Shiqi Xi’an Shi Wei Zhongxin de Kaochai (乳业与城市近
代化：以抗战时期西安市为中心的考察 ) [Dairy Industry and Early Urban
Modernization: An Investigation Centered on War-Era Xi’an], 16 J. SHENYANG U.
SOC. SCI. 636, 636 (2014).
40 Yang Zhiyong, supra note 32, at 224.
41 Id. at 225.
42 Id.
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In 1906, the Qing government launched an all-out campaign
to eliminate the sale, distribution, consumption, and cultivation of
opium to fight the nationwide opium addiction. 43 Seizing the
political opportunity, Nestlé (which by then had merged with AngloSwiss Milk Company) advertised its milk products as a healthrestoring food to fight the addiction.44 Marrying Western science
with traditional Chinese medicine and a Western merchandise with
Chinese politics, one advertisement read:
Milk produced by our company is made by chemists
with innovative and improved methods. . . . Milk is
the most vital food for life, regardless of whether
you are male or female, old or young. Drinking our
milk can smooth the blood and energy flow (qi),
build the muscles, improve the spirit and essence,
and strengthen the body. . . . Today China has
decided to ban opium; determined men and women
should all abstain [from opium consumption]. But
the weak body and exhausted spirit are worrisome.
Purchasing and consuming our milk will be greatly
beneficial . . .45
In the Chinese political history, the Opium War marked the
beginning of China’s “century of humiliation.”46 It ushered in an era
of imperial invasions, payments of war indemnities,
extraterritoriality, colonial enclaves, domestic peasant uprisings,
government’s failed reforms of modernization, and more broadly, an
existential crisis for China as a nation. 47 The national plight
prompted Chinese intellectuals, social reformers, and government
officials to debate how to reform China’s political, economic, and
cultural systems to escape imperialism and semi-colonialism, and
whether China should borrow Western technologies, institutions, and
values to achieve these goals.48

43

Joyce Madancy, Unearthing Popular Attitudes Toward the Opium Trade and
Opium Suppression in Late Qing and Early Republican Fujian, 27 MODERN CHINA
436, 439−40 (2001).
44 Yang Zhiyong, supra note 32, at 225.
45 Id.
46
Matt Schiavenza, How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History, THE
ATLANTIC (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how
-humiliation-drove-modern-chinese-history/280878/.
47 See generally, LOVELL, supra note 34.
48 See, e.g., FRANK DIKÖTTER, THE DISCOURSE OF RACE IN MODERN CHINA 127–29
(1992) (providing a succinct description of these debates).
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A key topic in these debates was the largely vegetarian
Chinese diet, which some Chinese and Western intellectuals blamed
as the cause of the “weak” physique of the Chinese people.49 Again,
the similarities between the U.S. and China regarding the
sociopolitical signification of milk were noticeable. In the midnineteenth century U.S. intellectuals and social reformers claimed
that milk could perfect the individual American body and, by
aggregation, the American society. 50 In late Qing and Republican
China intelligentsia, policymakers, agriculturalists, and urban dairy
entrepreneurs glorified milk as the “perfect food” to build a strong
Chinese population and, over time, a strong Chinese nation.51
Also as in the U.S. decades earlier, children were put at the
forefront of societal progress.52 One social reformer urged:
In a situation in which China represents the “sick
man” of Asia, if we want to revitalize the Chinese
nation (fuxing zhonghua minzu) and revive national
power (guoshi), it is even more imperative that we
earnestly work [on the problem of child nutrition],
because national rejuvenation (fuxing minzu)
depends on a healthy citizenry, and without healthy
children, how can there be a healthy nation?53
As “milk became a symbol of Western wealth and power,”54
Chinese reformers urged urban middle-class women to feed their
children fresh cow’s milk or condensed milk and milk powder from
America. 55 Just like their American sisters, the urban Chinese
“middleclass wife became the ‘republican mother’ responsible for
the creation of a moral civil society.”56 By 1928, cow’s milk had

49

Sabban, supra note 1, at 187–194.
DUPUIS, supra note 31, at 8, 17; Wiley, supra note 18, at 16–18.
51 Sabban, supra note 1, at 186–194.
52 FU, supra note 5, at 98.
53 Id. Foreign companies such as Nestlé and Heinz continue to impact food
consumption habits and cultural notions about food in China today. See, e.g., Jun
Jing, Introduction: Food, Children, and Social Change in Contemporary China, in
FEEDING CHINA’S LITTLE EMPERORS: FOOD, CHILDREN, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 17–
20 (Jun Jing ed., 2000) [hereafter FEEDING CHINA’S LITTLE EMPERORS]; Eriberto P.
Lozada, Jr., Globalized Childhood? Kentucky Fried Chicken in Beijing, in FEEDING
CHINA’S LITTLE EMPERORS, supra note 53, at 114–34; Suzanne K. Gottschang, A
Baby-Friendly Hospital and the Science of Infant Feeding, in FEEDING CHINA’S
LITTLE EMPERORS, supra note 53, at 160–84.
54 FU, supra note 5, at 89.
55 Sabban, supra note 1, at 186–194.
56 DUPUIS, supra note 31, at 57; FU, supra note 5, at 101.
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become a popular food among the elites of the Chinese
government.57
Despite the fervor for milk among intellectuals,
policymakers, and urban elites, “the birth of the Chinese interest in
milk” was limited to the urban educated middle class.58 According
to a 1936 Chinese article, it was estimated that China then had only
ten thousand dairy cows and an annual milk production of under
thirty million pounds.59 As one Chinese milk advocate admitted in
1939, cow’s milk was still “an aristocratic beverage” beyond the
reach of ordinary Chinese people.”60
It was in this context that doujiang, a distinctly Chinese drink
with similar color and nutritional richness, was given a new cultural
and political life, elevated to the status of “milk,” and promoted as
the pragmatic Chinese substitute for cow’s milk.61 To progressive
intellectuals and reformers of Republican China, doujiang
symbolized Chinese frugality, inventiveness, and hope of
rejuvenation.62 Doujiang offered “a Chinese path of development.”63
In 1949, the Communist Party of China (“CCP”) took power
and founded the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). 64 The
Communist government established dairy factories around big cities
to provide milk for urban children and elderly residents. 65 The
production of cow’s milk more than quadrupled during the Mao
era.66
After 1978, rapid economic growth led to a rapid rise in
personal income. 67 Following its Republican predecessor, the
57

Shao Yishu, supra note 38, at 17.
Sabban, supra note 1, at 186–194.
59 Geng Lei, supra note 39, at 636.
60 Sabban, supra note 1, at 186.
61 FU, supra note 5, 102–08.
62 Id. at 180.
63 Id. at 90.
64 Timeline of China’s Modern History, CHI. PUB. LIBRARY, https://www.chipublib.
org/timeline-of-chinas-modern-history/ (last updated Apr. 30, 2012).
65 Changbai Xiu & K.K. Klein, Melamine in Milk Products in China: Examining
the Factors That Led to Deliberate Use of the Contaminant, 35 FOOD POL. 463, 465
(2010).
66 Shen Mei (沈美 ), Niunai Chanliang bi Jianguo Chiqi Zengzhang 154 Bei,
Zhongguo Shixian “Da Fazhan” (牛奶产量比建国初期增长 154 倍，中国实现
“大发展”) [Cow’s Milk Production 154 Times the Level of the PRC’s Founding,
China Realizes “Big Development”], XINHUA WANG (新华网) [XINHUA NET] (July
20, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/food/2019-07/12/c_1124744433.htm.
67 See GDP Per Capita (Current US$)–China, THE WORLD BANK, https://data.worl
dbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN (last visited July 16, 2020).
58
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Communist government launched various nutrition campaigns
promoting cow’s milk, deploying the same cultural and political
tropes about milk, child development, and national rejuvenation.68
One slogan epitomizes this blend of “scientific nutritionism” with
nationalism: “A glass of cow’s milk strengthens a nation” (“一杯牛
奶 强 壮 一 个 民 族 ”). This slogan is repeatedly mentioned in
governmental documents, news media, and as the opening sentence
of an annual report by the China Dairy Association. 69
China’s emerging dairy companies eagerly embraced these
cultural meanings of milk and, like their Republican-era
predecessors, tapped into the mothering role of women in dairy
advertisements. China’s first dairy giant, Wahaha Group, for
instance, had a catchy song in their advertisements in the 1990s and
2000s: “Sweet and sour, nutritious and delicious. I drink it every day.
How happy I am! Mama, I want to drink Wahaha Fruit Milk.” 70
68

FU, supra note 5, at 188–89; Wiley, supra note 18, at 16–20; Eugenia Y. Lean,
The Modern Elixir: Medicine as a Consumer Item in the Early Twentieth-Century
Chinese Press, 15 UCLA HIST. J. 65, 77 (1995). One of these milk promotion
campaigns was the “School Milk Program” launched in 2000. It was similar to the
school health and “Got Milk” ad campaigns in the twentieth century U.S. The
program has evolved over the years. For more detailed information, please visit the
program’s official website, https://www.schoolmilk.cn/s/index.
69 Guowuyuan (国务院) [State Council], Guanyu Tuijin Naiye Zhenxing Baozhang
Rupin Zhiliang Anquan de Yijian (关于推进奶业振兴保障乳品质量安全的意见)
[Opinion on Further Revitalizing the Dairy Industry and Guaranteeing the Quality
and Safety of Dairy Productions], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG
RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (June 3, 2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/c
ontent/2018-06/11/content_5297839.htm; Tan Zhongyang (谭中杨), Yibei Niunai
Nengfou Qiangzhuang Yige Minzu–Xuesheng Yinyong Nai Jihua Jieshi Aoyunhui
Jiangpai Bang Beihou de Mimi (一杯牛奶能否强壮一个民族？—“学生饮用奶计
划”揭示奥运会奖牌榜背后的秘密) [Can a Glass of Cow’s Milk Strengthen a
Nation?—“Student Drinking Milk Plan” Reveals the Secret Behind the Olympic
Medal List], ZHONGGUO JIAOYU XINWEN WANG (中国教育新闻网) [CHINA EDUC.
NEWS] (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.jyb.cn/china/tyjk/201608/t20160828_670343.h
tml; ZHONGGUO NAI YE XIEHUI (中国奶业协会) [CHINA DAIRY ASS’N], ZHONGGUO
NAI YE ZHILIANG BAOGAO ( 中 国 奶 业 质 量 报 告 ) [CHINESE DAIRY INDUSTRY
QUALITY REPORT] (2017).
70 See Lanting Ke (兰亭客) [Lantinger], 90 Niandai Wahaha Guo Nai de Guanggao
(90 年代娃哈哈果奶的广告) [90's Wahaha Fruit Milk Advertisements], TENGXUN
SHIPIN (騰訊視頻) [TENCENT VIDEO] (Mar. 19, 2017), https://v.qq.com/x/page/f038
5ili6zz.html (showing a video of some of these advertisements). For a detailed
account of the relationship between Wahaha and the Chinese government and the
role the company played in the Chinese government’s effort of nation building, see
Zhao Yang, State, Children, and the Wahaha Group of Hangzhou, in FEEDING
CHINA’S LITTLE EMPERORS, supra note 53, at 185–98. Ironically, the French food
company Danone bought a controlling interest in Wahaha in 1997. Id. at 197. As
this article later illustrates, the fate of Wahaha embodies the bittersweet relationship
between building a strong Chinese nation and embracing globalization.
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China’s per capita dairy consumption more than tripled between
1996 and 2006.71
B. Property Law and China’s Small, Egalitarian Farm
Structure
During the majority of the Mao era, land and agricultural
production were collectivized.
Rural collectives (People’s
Communes) and state-owned farms owned all rural land, farm
animals, and agricultural equipment. 72 Villagers worked for their
rural collective earning daily work points, which were then used as a
basis for distributing the collective harvests and revenues amongst
themselves.73 Workers of state-owned farms worked for the farms
and earned monetary wages.74 Property relations concerning dairy
operations were very similar to those in the Soviet Ukraine; cows
were the property of rural collectives or state-owned farms, and cow
raising was the responsibility of rural farm workers (particularly
women and children).75 Beginning in 1982, however, the CCP and
the Chinese government created what would later be called the
Household Responsibility System (“HRS”). 76 Under HRS, rural
collectives and state-owned farms were required to sell agricultural
equipment and farm animals and rent out land plots to individual
households;77 rent was zero for collective land but a positive sum for
state land.78 To avoid frequent redistribution of land, the CCP and
the central government fixed rural citizens’ rights to use and farm
land plots to fifteen years in 1984.79 However, resistance to longXiangdong Lu & Huilai Zong, The Problems and Countermeasures After China’s
Dairy Enters the Adjustment Period, 7 AG. ECON. PROBLEMS 5 (2008).
72 HUAIYIN LI, VILLAGE CHINA UNDER SOCIALISM AND REFORM: A MICRO HISTORY,
1948-2008, 23−49, 82 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2009); Forrest Zhang, Reforming
China’s State-Owned Farms: State Farms in Agrarian Transition, 2010 4TH ASIAN
RURAL SOC. ASS’N INT’L CONF., 365, 367−70, http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_re
search/1089.
73 LI, supra note 72, at 35−47, 96−97, 100−01, 131−33, 147−48.
74 Zhang, supra note 72, at 370; see also infra Section II.C.ii.
75 Author’s archival and fieldwork research, on file with Author; Monica Eppinger,
Herding History: Legal Change, Norm Formation, and Transformation of the
Dairyspheres of Post-Soviet Ukraine, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Dec.
2020).
76
ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG ( 中 国 共 产 党 ) & GUOWUYUAN ( 国 务 院 )
[COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA & STATE COUNCIL], Quanguo Nongcun Gongzuo
Huiyi Jiyao (全国农村工作会议纪要) [Summaries of the National Rural Work
Conference] (1982).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79
ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG ( 中 国 共 产 党 ) & GUOWUYUAN ( 国 务 院 )
[COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA & STATE COUNCIL], DANGQIAN NONGCUN JINGJI
ZHENGCE DE RUOGAN WENTI (当前农村经济政策的若干问题) [SOME PROBLEMS
IN CURRENT RURAL ECONOMIC POLICY] (1983).
71
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term private property rights was strong in the initial years of reform,
and the fifteen-year policy was not implemented until after 1993,
when tenure security became a governance priority.80
The implementation of HRS had profound consequences for
China’s agriculture and rural residents. First, it created one of the
most egalitarian distributions of land in the world in the form of
private rights to possess, use, and benefit from land. 81 This
egalitarianism was further consolidated by frequent village-wide
land redistributions to accommodate changes in household
demographics or in the total land area as well as by the prohibition
of for-profit transfers of landholdings.82 In the late 1990s and early
2000s, laws were enacted to fix village-wide land redistributions to
once every thirty years.83 While these laws increased the duration
and security of rural land tenure, the latter differs from private
landownership in two critical respects. Rural households cannot sell
or mortgage their land.84 When the current tenure expires, all rural
residents—as members of the village—will be entitled to receive
new tenure in the new round of land distribution.85
Second, the egalitarian land distribution, the prohibition of
land sales, and a high population/land area ratio created a stable
agricultural economic structure comprised almost exclusively of
small family farms, with an average size of as low as 0.6 acre of land
per farmer according to a 2010 FAO estimate. 86 Reflecting this
ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG ( 中 国 共 产 党 ) & GUOWUYUAN ( 国 务 院 )
[COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA & STATE COUNCIL], GUANYU DANGQIAN NONGYE HE
NONGCUN JINGJI FAZHAN DE RUOGAN ZHENGCE CUOSHI (关于当前农业和农村经
济发展的若干政策措 施) [CERTAIN POLICY MEASURES CONCERNING CURRENT
AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT] (1993) [hereinafter 1993
POLICY MEASURES].
81 PETER HO, INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION: LAND OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHTS,
AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN CHINA 9–10 (2005).
82 See id.
83 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Fa (中华人民共和国
农村土地承包法) [Rural Land Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 2002,
effective Mar. 1, 2003) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Oct. 10, 2002, at 28, art. 20 [hereinafter
Rural Land Contract Law]. Most recently, the CCP and central Chinese government
jointly issued a policy document, extending the current rural land tenure by another
30 years. ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG (中国共产党) & GUOWUYUAN (国务院)
[COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA & STATE COUNCIL], GUANYU BAOCHI TUDI
CHENGBAO GUANXI WENDING BING CHANGJIU BUBIAN DE YIJIAN (关于保持土地承
包关系稳定并长久不变的意见) [THE OPINION ON MAINTAINING THE STABILITY
AND LONG-TERM FIXITY OF LAND CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS] (2019).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Lin Wanlong (林万龙), Nongdi Jingying Guimo: Guoji Jingyan yu Zhongguo de
Xianshi Xuanze (农地经营规模：国际经验与中国的现实选择) [Rural Land
80
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economic structure, China’s dairy and soybean farms were small;
many of the farmers grew other crops, raised other animals, or
engaged in simultaneous non-agricultural work.87
China’s partial privatization of landholdings was
implemented alongside market liberalization reforms. Beginning in
November 1993, the Chinese government enacted a series of policy
changes, with the goals of (1) opening up agricultural input and
output markets and letting the market set the price of goods; (2)
transforming state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) into market players
with clear property rights and independent management and
finances; and (3) allowing for-profit transfers of rural land in the
form of subleases. 88 In the same year, China began serious
negotiations to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”), the predecessor to the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”).89
The rising demand for agricultural goods drove prices up
between 1980 and 1996.90 The increased price, in a system of private
operation of farms, further stimulated the production of cow’s milk
and soybeans. Between 1991 and 2000, China’s cow’s milk
production nearly doubled, and its soybean production increased
more than 60%.91 By some calculations, at the time China joined the
Production Scale: International Experiences and China’s Realistic Choice], 7
NONGYE JINGJI WENTI (农业经济问题) [ISSUES IN AGRIC. ECON.] 33, 37 (2017).
87 See, e.g., CHINA'S PEASANT AGRICULTURE AND RURAL SOCIETY: CHANGING
PARADIGMS OF FARMING 25−44 (Jan Douwe van der Ploeg & Jingzong Ye eds., 2016)
[hereinafter CHINA’S PEASANT AGRICULTURE AND RURAL SOCIETY] (providing a rich
description and analysis of Chinese farmers’ multiple economic activities).
88 1993 POLICY MEASURES, supra note 80.
89 Monica Hsiao, China and the GATT: Two Theories of Political Economy
Explaining China’s Desire for Membership in the GATT, 12 PACIFIC BASIN L. J. 431,
431 (1994).
90 9-10 Quanguo Nongchanpin Shougou Jiage Fenlei Zhishu (9-10 全国农产品收
购 价 格 分 类 指 数 ) [9-10 National Agricultural Product Purchase Price
Classification Index], 2001 NIAN ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN (2001 年中国统计
年鉴) [2001 CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2001c
/i0910c.htm (last visited July 16, 2020) (cataloging major agricultural product
purchasing price indexes from 1978 to 2000).
91 For dairy statistics, see ZHONGGUO NONGYE NIANJIAN BIANJI WEIYUANHUI (中国
农业年鉴编辑委员会) [COMPILATION COMM. OF THE CHINESE AGRIC. YEARBOOK
SERIES], NONGYE BU ( 农 业 部 ) [MINISTRY OF AGRIC.], ZHONGGUO NONGYE
NIANJIAN (中国农业年鉴) [CHINA AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK] (1991) (providing
that in 1991, China produced 5,243,000 tons of milk); see also ZHONGGUO NONGYE
NIANJIAN BIANJI WEIYUANHUI (中国农业年鉴编辑委员会) [COMPILATION COMM.
OF THE CHINESE AGRIC. YEARBOOK SERIES], NONGYE BU (农业部) [MINISTRY OF
AGRIC.], ZHONGGUO NONGYE NIANJIAN (中 国农 业年鉴 ) [CHINA AGRICULTURE
YEARBOOK] (2001) (providing that in 2000, China produced 9,191,000 tons of milk).
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WTO, China had somewhere between thirty-one million and fiftyfour million soybean farmers and 1.4 million dairy farmers.92 There
was no or very little mechanization for either dairy or soybean
production.93
C. Dairy and Soybeans in Rural Chinese Life
Administratively, China is governed by the central,
provincial, prefectural, county, and township governments. 94 The
village is not part of government, although its governance is heavily

For soybean statistics, see 12-17 Zhuyao Nongchanpin Chanliang (12-17 主要农产
品产量) [12-17 Output of Major Agricultural Products], 2001 NIAN ZHONGGUO
TONGJI NIANJIAN (2001 年中国统计年鉴) [2001 CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK],
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2001c/l1217c.htm.
92 These numbers are very rough estimates. According to the China Statistics
Yearbook 2002, in 2001 China’s total acreage of crop cultivation was 155,708,000
hectares; the total acreage of soybean cultivation was 13,268,000 hectares, and the
total number of people employed in agriculture was 365.13 million. 12-14
Nongzuowu Zong Bozhong Mianji (12-14 农作物总播种面积) [12-14 Total Sown
Area of Crops] 2002 NIAN ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN (2002 年中国统计年鉴)
[2002 CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], http://www.stats.gov.cn/yearbook2001/index
C.htm; 5-1 Jiuye Jiben Qingkuang (5-1 就业基本情况 ) [5-1 Basic Employment
Situation],2002 NIAN ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN (2002 年中国统计年鉴) [2002
CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], http://www.stats.gov.cn/yearbook2001/indexC.htm.
Given China’s roughly egalitarian distribution of farmland in 2001, the thirty-one
million estimate is calculated by dividing the total soybean acreage by the total crop
acreage, multiplied by the total number of people employed in agriculture. The fiftyfour million estimate is based on FAO data, which estimates the average land size
per farmer in China to be 0.24 hectare. Lin Wanlong, supra note 86, at 37. Dividing
the total soybean acreage in 2001 from China Statistics Yearbook 2002 by 0.24
hectare will yield the number fifty-four million. The total dairy farmer estimate is
made by dividing the total number of dairy cows (5,662,000) at the end of 2001 by
the average size of Chinese dairy farms (3-5 cows) in 2002. 2002 ZHONGGUO NAI
YE NIANJIAN (2002 中国奶业年鉴) [2002 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] tbl.
1-4 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2002) (end-of-the-year number of dairy cows 19492001); 2003 ZHONGGUO NAI YE NIANJIAN (2003 中国奶业年鉴 ) [2003 CHINA
DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] 32 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2003).
93 A term of art for describing small, non-mechanized dairy farms in China in the
2000s is “backyard dairy farms.” The image is a rural family raising cows in their
backyard. See e.g. H. Ma et al., The Evolution of Productivity Performance on
China’s Dairy Farms in the New Millennium, 95 J. DAIRY SCI. 7074 (2012). For
literature on low levels of mechanization for crop cultivation, see e.g., Xiaobing
Wang et al., Wage Growth, Landholding, and Mechanization in Chinese Agriculture,
86 WORLD DEV. 30, 32 (2016) (charts illustrating percentages of land plowed,
planted, and harvested by machines from 1980 to 2011).
94 Administrative Division, STATE COUNCIL, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/ch
ina_abc/2014/08/27/content_281474983873401.htm (last updated Aug. 26, 2014);
see also OECD, EDUCATION IN CHINA: A SNAPSHOT 9 (2016).
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influenced by the government.95 Parts of rural China are State Farms
(guoyou nongchang, 国有农场).96 They are governed by the State
Farm system comprised of the central, provincial, district, farm, and
unit administrations.97 Mountain County in southern inland China is
governed by the regular administrative system.98 River District in
Heilongjiang Province in northeastern China is governed by the State
Farm system.99
I conducted eleven months of ethnographic work and four
months of historical research in Mountain County and River District
between 2014 and 2016. Both counties have had a predominantly
rural economy and population and are undergoing some
industrialization and urbanization.
This fieldwork included
participant observation, casual conversations, semi-structured and
structured interviews, and household surveys. I talked to roughly
two hundred interlocutors in Mountain County and three hundred
interlocutors in River District. Historical research consisted mostly
of reading local chronicles, old newspapers, government documents,
family genealogies, and published or unpublished memoirs. Some
of these files were kept in local, prefectural, or provincial museums
and libraries. Some are book copies or photocopies that my
interlocutors kindly gave me. Some have been made accessible
online.
i. Mountain County: Peaceful Rural Nostalgia100
Mountain County has 400,000 residents, is a land mass
slightly smaller than Rhode Island, and has over twenty townships,
each of which in turn governs a dozen or two villages. It is a ricegrowing region. The mountainous terrain, land scarcity, and long
95

Compare STATE COUNCIL, supra note 94 (showing that the village is not an
officially recognized form of government), with Yi Wu, Land Rights, Political
Differentiation, and China’s Changing Land Market: Bounded Collectivism and
Contemporary Village Administration, 14 ASIA PAC. J. 1, 1–4 (2016).
96 Zhang, supra note 72, at 365–67; Philip C.C. Huang & Yuan Gao, The Dynamics
of Capitalization in Chinese Agriculture: Private Firms, the State, or Peasant
Households?, 10 RURAL CHINA 36, 65 (2003).
97 Author’s own archival and fieldwork research, on file with Author.
98 I deliberately avoid identifying the province in which Mountain County is located
because I have done fieldwork relating to villager-conducted illegal real estate
development in Mountain County; not identifying the province will better protect
the anonymity of my fieldwork interlocutors there. See Xiaoqian Hu, “Put That
Bucket Down!”: Monday, Politics, and Property Rights in Urbanizing China, 44 VT.
L. REV. 243 (2019).
99 See Zhang, supra note 72, at 368;
100 The statements made in this section rely on the Author’s own fieldwork and
historical research in Mountain County.
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distances to major urban centers precluded the development of a
local dairy industry. To the extent that dairy was featured at all in
Mountain County in the twentieth century, it was either in the form
of milk powder as a nutritional supplement for the children and
elderly people of relatively resourceful families or as a valuable
social gift for infants and convalescents. Non-fresh cow’s milk was
introduced to a few restaurants in the county seat in the 1990s as a
breakfast drink, along with doujiang, and cost twice as much as
doujiang. Mountain County did not develop a fresh cow’s milk
market until the mid-2000s, when refrigerated trucks became
available, and an extensive network of paved roads was being built.
Contrary to dairy’s virtual absence, soybeans were an
indispensable part of Mountain County’s rural economy and dietary
culture. After the implementation of HRS in the early 1980s, each
rural family would grow soybeans and raise at least one pig on the
farm. Most soybeans were grown on the dividers that separated
individual families’ rice paddies or embanked hillside rice terraces.
Growing soybeans on the long narrow dividers formed a symbiosis
with rice cultivation. As the divider was made of dirt, it needed
reinforcement to avoid collapsing. Soybean roots provided such
reinforcement. Meanwhile, water from the paddies provided
irrigation for the beans. Growing soybeans on dividers also allowed
families to cultivate other crops on the precious, scarce land; these
other crops included wheat, mulberry trees (for raising silkworms),
and sorghum (for feeding pigs).
Rural families kept most of their soybeans for selfconsumption, and soybeans were consumed chiefly in four ways.
First, soybeans were consumed as a fresh vegetable in late spring.
The lack of greenhouse vegetable farming and of a sophisticated
agricultural market meant that rural families in Mountain County
only had preserved vegetables to go with the rice during the long
winter and much of the spring. As spring was ending, soybeans
would grow plump while still green and tender. Families would stir
fry them as a fresh vegetable dish to break the monotonous wintry
diet. Second, soybeans were consumed as a protein-rich food for the
Spring Festival, which is a three-week-long holiday in Mountain
County. In Mountain County in the 1980s and 1990s, the last week
of lunar December was the week to prepare for the Spring Festival.
Rural families would slaughter a home-raised pig and make large
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quantities of tofu from home-grown soybeans.101 Third, soybeans
were processed as foods for daily consumption, particularly during
the cold months of the year. These included fermented beans,
fermented tofu, or soybean powder.102 Soybean powder, like milk
powder, was sweetened with sugar and consumed with hot water and
was a treat for children and the elderly. Fourth, rural families would
exchange some of their soybeans for precious cash. Such exchange
created a local soybean processing industry in which family-run tofu
shops sold tofu to urban as well as rural families, and family-run food
stands served hot, fresh soymilk to urban breakfast eaters.
ii. River District: Tumultuous Market Opening103
River District has roughly 150,000 residents, is a land mass
twice the size of Rhode Island, and has over ten State Farms and over
one hundred Units. Land is abundant and located on flat plains or
gentle, rolling hills. Plots are large and rectangular and farmed with
heavy machines. The soybean is one of the two crops grown in the
region (the other being wheat before 2008 and corn after 2008).
Unlike in Mountain County, dairy has always been an important part
of the local economy since the District’s creation in the Mao era.
During the Mao era, residents enjoyed stable wages, free
public housing, and other welfare benefits conferred by State Farms.
Farm governments also cultivated among residents a collective
identity and sense of pride as employees of technologically advanced
socialist State Farms.
While rural residents in Mountain County unequivocally
welcomed HRS in the 1980s, residents of River District
overwhelmingly opposed it. Residents feared that HRS would
destroy all the material entitlements, collective identity, and sense of
pride that came with the status of a State Farm employee.104 As one
Tofu and pork (and fish) are essential dishes on the New Year’s Eve dinner or at
meals with relatives and friends. See generally Watson, supra note 13 (discussing
the cultural and ritual importance of pork in rural Chinese life).
102 Landoushi means rotten soybean food. Interestingly, the local dialect for
fermented tofu (douru) literally means soy milk. Doumi means soybean mist or dust,
due to its fineness. It is also interesting that the process of making tofu from soymilk
is very similar to that of making fresh cheese from milk, and the same can be said
for fermented tofu and some fermented cheeses, as well as for doufuhua (literally
means tofu flower—a silky, semi-curdled product before the curd turns into tofu)
and yoghurt.
103 The statements made in this section rely on the Author’s own fieldwork and
historical research in River District.
104 As a matter of fact, HRS was met with huge resistance in Heilongjiang Province,
which had a much higher land-to-population ratio and degree of mechanization than
101
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expression captured from the time, “We did decades of hard work,
only to be reverted to the pre-liberation era overnight” (“辛辛苦苦
几十年，一夜回到解放前”).105 To induce compliance with HRS,
Farm and Unit administrations sold machines and animals, including
cows, at highly discounted rates to machine operators, Unit officials,
and other residents and encouraged them to rent large areas of land
at low rates (families renting large areas of land were locally called
“family farms,” 家庭农场). Public housing was also sold to the
resident household. To allay some of workers’ fears, Farm and Unit
administrations preserved the worker status of the former employees
and continued to subsidize their social security payments.
A thorough implementation of HRS did not take hold due to
a combination of factors: increasing wealth inequality between a few
successful “family farms” and the remaining small farming
households; the frustration and fear of a large number of failing
“family farms”; and the need for revenue for the administration to
provide social services and bail out failing “family farms.” Hence,
in the 1990s, there was an institutional reversal in which the vast
majority of the land was managed and farmed by teams consisting of
Unit officials and machine drivers, while a minority of the land was
managed and farmed by a large number of households, each renting
a small amount of land (locally called “small households,” “小户”).
Despite this partial reversal for grain production, dairy farms, which
were small in scale, were never re-collectivized.
Between 1993 and 2001, the opening up of the agricultural
input and output markets caused devastating price fluctuations for
farmers in River District. Before 1993, grain prices were set by the
state and were set low to subsidize China’s urban industrialization.106
Market opening led to immediate increases in grain prices. Between
the rest of the country. See JAE HO CHUNG, CENTRAL CONTROL AND LOCAL
DISCRETION IN CHINA: LEADERSHIP AND IMPLEMENTATION DURING POST-MAO
DECOLLECTIVIZATION (Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (providing an in-depth analysis of
provincial implementations of HRS).
105 The pre-liberation era means the years before 1949. The CCP and contemporary
Chinese government portray the pre-liberation era as a dark era of feudalism, semicolonialism, and corrupt state capitalism. See Robert Weatherly & Coirle Magee,
Using the Past to Legitimise the Present: The Portrayal of Good Governance in
Chinese History Textbooks, 47 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 41, 42, 62–63 (2018).
106 Luo Jinqiang (罗进强) & Ren Liming (任立民), Woguo Liangshi Caizheng
Butie de Lishi Yanbian Jiqi Zhongyao Zuoyong (我国粮食财政补贴的历史演变及
其重要作用) [The Historical Evolution and Importance of China’s Grain Subsidies],
in ZHONGGUO LIANGSHI GAIGE KAIFANG SANSHI NIAN (中国粮食改革开放三十年)
[THIRTY YEARS OF CHINA’S GRAIN REFORM AND OPENING] 123 (China Grain Econ.
Inst. & China Grain Indust. Ass’n eds., 2009).
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1993 and 1996, the price of wheat more than doubled, and the price
of soybeans increased by two-thirds. 107 Higher prices stimulated
grain production nationwide, and prices began to fall. Between 1996
and 2000, the price of wheat decreased by 38%, and the price of
soybeans decreased by 26%.108
While the fall of wheat prices was caused by increased
production vis-à-vis a relatively stable demand, the situation with
soybean prices was slightly different, though it led to the same
outcome. As personal income rose, meat consumption rose and
created a huge demand for soymeal. This should, in a closed
economy, increase soybean prices. However, China was negotiating
its WTO entry; importing soybeans would not only meet the rapidly
increasing demand for soymeal, but it would also show China’s
willingness to participate in international trade.109 As a result, total
soybean import went from 2.9 million tons in 1995 to 12.8 million
tons in 2000.110 The in-pouring of foreign beans caused prices for
domestic beans to stagnate in 1997 and to fall in 1998.111
The market opening crushed River District’s economy, as
half of the district’s farmland was used for growing wheat, and the
other half was used for growing soybeans. Between 1996 and 1999,
the local price of soybeans decreased by 35%, and the local price of
wheat decreased by 18%. Interlocutors who were once agricultural
team members recounted with anger and anguish the “dark old days”
of the late 1990s and early 2000s. “Year after year we were losing
money and going deeper in debt.”112 Team members were afraid to
farm the land. Some left the teams altogether. The total cultivated
area decreased by 7% in 1999 and further decreased by 6% in 2000.

107

The numbers are calculated based on purchasing price indexes between 1993
and 1996. 9-10 Quanguo Nongchanpin Shougou Jiage Fenlei Zhishu (9-10 全国农
产品收购价格分类指数 ) [9-10 National Agricultural Product Purchase Price
Index], 2001 NIAN ZHONGGUO TONGJI NIANJIAN (2001 年中国统计年鉴) [2001
CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK], http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2001c/i0910c.htm
[hereinafter 2001 National Agricultural Product Purchase Price Index].
108 The numbers are calculated based on purchasing price indexes between 1996
and 2000. Id.
109 Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 177–78 (explaining the connection
between soybean imports and rising pork consumption in China).
110 FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select
the “Crops and livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “China”
in the countries field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select
“Soybeans” in the items field; select “1995” and “2000” in the year field; click
“Show Data”).
111 2001 National Agricultural Product Purchase Price Index, supra note 107.
112 Xiaoqian Hu, Fieldwork Journal 2015-045 (on file with author).
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Agriculture was not the only sector harmed by market
opening. Since the late 1980s, River District had been facing an
explosion of the labor force, as workers’ children, who were born in
the 1960s and 1970s (before China’s compulsory family planning
policy was implemented), reached adulthood. To create employment
for these young adults, the District and Farm administrations
established factories processing agricultural and husbandry
materials. Market opening struck a heavy blow to these factories and
their farmer-suppliers. Many of them were closed down or sold off
cheaply to private individuals in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Facing falling wheat and soybean prices, dwindling
revenues, and the closing down of state-owned factories, the River
District administration (and the Provincial State Farm
Administration) looked to dairy and pork—the prices of which were
still rising due to rapidly increasing urban consumption—as ways to
diversify the local economy. The administration promoted “a
courtyard economy” (“庭院经济”) and encouraged each family to
raise “two cows and one pig” (“两牛一猪”). To expand the local
dairy industry, Farm administrations purchased cows from bigger
farms near major cities in northern China and resold them to local
dairy farmers on deferred payments. To make sure that dairy farmers
were able to sell their milk, Farm administrations also established
state-owned dairy processing companies to purchase raw milk.
Despite these efforts, the dairy strategy was struggling to succeed.
Around 2001, the last and biggest dairy processing company in River
District declared bankruptcy, and dairy farmers had to sell milk to
individual milk merchants, who then transported the milk to dairy
processing companies in big cities hundreds of miles away.
While many factories were closed down or sold off during
the market liberalization reform, the District and Provincial
administrations restructured, incorporated, and expanded a handful
of factories known as “dragon-head enterprises” (“龙头企业,” the
same term as is used by the central Chinese state now) to serve as
engines of job creation and economic growth. These included,
among others, the Heilongjiang Wonderson Dairy Product Co Ltd (
完达山).
Despite these efforts, there was massive unemployment in
River District. Over 40,000 people—out of a total population of less
than 150,000—lost jobs. Some of them, particularly women, exited
the work force and became homemakers. Many residents engaged
in non-agricultural activities. Many people—especially young
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people—left home and worked in Beijing, Tianjin, and Dalian as
migrant workers. With a decrease in land rents and a lack of funding
from upper governments, the District administration cut spending in
the late 1990s. Many offices were combined or terminated, and
many employees were laid off or retained on contractual terms.
Many teachers, who had been contractual workers rather than state
employees, were fired. Unit elementary schools were eliminated,
and the students were transferred to the elementary school in the
Farm administration seat tens of kilometers away.113
***
In the Chinese sociopolitical life, milk is a living symbol of
the Sino-West encounter, and of all the conflicts, aspirations,
ambivalences, and uncertainties that this encounter entails. Prior to
the twentieth century, the Chinese government was unwilling to open
its market to the West but was forced to do so under gunboat
diplomacy. A hundred years later, the Chinese government not only
voluntarily opened its market, but also sought to institutionalize the
opening through joining the WTO. Once again, milk―and soy―are
at the center of China’s relationship with the West, and more broadly,
China’s relationship with globalization. If the history of milk in
twentieth-century China was intellectual and political and affected
primarily the urban elites, the history of milk in twenty-first-century
China is economic and political and affects the entire Chinese
society―from villagers to urbanites to the ruling elite.
III. Market Opening and Trade Shocks
A. China Opens Up Dairy and Soybean Trade
In December 2001, China joined the WTO.114 As part of the
accession agreement, China drastically weakened protections for
domestic dairy and soybean producers. Although a developing
country, China agreed to not use the investment subsidy exemption

113

With hindsight, the elimination of Unit elementary schools was inevitable, as
China’s family planning policy was rapidly reducing the student population. Yet,
the process was quickened by a lack of government funds. See generally Lu
Hongyong, Rural School Closures Are Leaving Young Children Out in the Cold,
SIXTH TONE (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1001617/ruralschool-closures-are-leaving-young-students-out-in-the-cold# (describing the vast
number of underfunded and slimly populated elementary schools in rural China from
the late 1990s to the present).
114 China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
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available to developing economies. 115 Compared with other
developing countries, China also agreed to a smaller percentage of
domestic support that is exempted from reduction commitment
calculations.116 Given that China had zero subsidies for agriculture
prior to joining the WTO, China is not allowed to provide additional
direct financial support to its agricultural producers beyond the
exempted percentage.117
China also reduced entry barriers for foreign agricultural
producers. China abolished, among other things: (1) state trading of
soybean and dairy imports, (2) soybean and dairy import licenses and
quotas, and (3) soybean and dairy export subsidies.118 In 2002, the
average tariff rate for imported soybeans was 2.4%, down from
114% prior to China’s WTO accession.119 In 1998, China’s statutory
tariff for dairy imports was 46%; the post-accession average was
11%.120
Limited ability to subsidize domestic producers, low tariff
rates, and the abolition of import licenses and quotas gave foreign
dairy and soybean farmers largely unrestricted access to the Chinese
market and freedom to compete with Chinese farmers. Had Chinese
farmers been able to produce soybeans and dairy at internationally
competitive prices, the impact of these concessions would have been

115

Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49, ¶ 235 (Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter
Working Party Report]; see WORLD TRADE ORG., Agreement on Agriculture, art. 6,
¶ 2, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm#articleVI (last
visited Mar. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
116 Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 115, at art. 6, ¶ 4(a), (b); see also Working
Party Report, supra note 115. This exempted percentage is called the de minimis
level. All WTO Members are granted a de minimis level. Agreement on Agriculture,
supra note 115, at art. 6, ¶ 4(a).
117 Working Party Report, supra note 115, at ¶ 235.
118 Working Party Report, supra note 115, ¶¶ 104–38; see also U.S. INT’L TRADE
COMM’N, CHINA’S AGRICULTURAL TRADE: COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS
ON U.S. EXPORTS, at 7-6 (2011).
119 Tariff Download Facility, WTO, http://tariffdata.wto.org/TariffList.aspx (last
visited July 29, 2020) (select “All years, bound tariffs included” in “Filter”; select
“China”; select “12 – Oil seeds” in “Products”; select subsection “1201- Soya beans,
whether or not broken”; click “Next”). The 2.4% rate was further reduced to a
combined tariff rate of 1.5% in 2012 and remains 1.5% to this day. Id.
120 Will Martin et al., China’s Accession to the WTO: Impacts on China, in EAST
ASIA INTEGRATES: A TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR SHARED GROWTH 35, 42 (Kathie
Krumm & Homi Kharas eds., 2004); see also Frank Fuller et al., China’s Accession
to the World Trade Organization: What Is at Stake for Agricultural Markets?, 25
REV. AGRIC. ECON. 399, 405 (2003).
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minimal. However, this was not the case for soybeans, and after
2008, this was no longer the case for dairy.121
B. Market Shock for China’s Soybean Industry: The 2004
Soybean Crisis
As income levels rose in China, demand also rose for meat
(primarily pork) and dairy.122 Today, China is the world’s largest
producer of pork, soymilk, and soy oil; the world’s second largest
producer of chicken; and, as mentioned earlier, the world’s third
largest producer of cow’s milk.123 The soybean experienced the most
dramatic transformation. For thousands of years it had been one of
the five staples in the traditional Chinese diet.124 Now, it has taken
on three concurrent roles in Chinese life: primarily, as an industrial
input for mass production of pork; secondarily, as the raw material
for making vegetable oil; and, only thirdly, as a food directly
consumed by humans. 125 Due to these multiple roles, China’s
soybean use nearly quadrupled between 2001 and 2017.126
Had Chinese soybean farmers been able to compete with
foreign producers, the rapid rise in soybean use would have been a
boon for Chinese farmers. This, however, was not the case. In 2001,
for example, China’s average producer’s price for soybeans was
approximately 1.5 times that of the U.S. and approximately 1.6 times
that of Brazil.127
121

See infra text accompanying note 127; see infra text accompanying notes 147–

52.
122

See, e.g., Yuna He et al., Consumption of Meat and Dairy Products in China: A
Review, 75 PROC. OF THE NUTRITION SOC’Y 385 (2016) (providing an overview of
China’s rising dairy and meat, especially pork, consumption).
123 Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 178; MINDI SCHNEIDER & SHEFALI
SHARMA, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, CHINA’S PORK MIRACLE?
AGRIBUSINESS AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA’S PORK INDUSTRY 7–8 (2014); U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 10, at 13.
124 WILLIAM SHURTLEFF ET AL., HISTORY OF SOYBEANS AND SOYFOODS IN CHINA
AND TAIWAN, AND IN CHINESE COOKBOOKS, RESTAURANTS, AND CHINESE WORK
WITH SOYFOODS OUTSIDE CHINA (1024 BCE TO 2014): EXTENSIVELY ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCEBOOK 43–44 (2014).
125 See, e.g., Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13 (providing an in-depth analysis of
the soybean’s multiple roles in contemporary China).
126 Market Database: Supply and Demand Overview, AGRIC. MKT. INFO. SYS.,
https://app.amis-outlook.org/#/market-database/supply-and-demand-overview (last
visited July 29, 2020) (select “China” in “Country/Region”; select “Soybean” in
“Commodity”; click “Download Entire Balance”).
127 FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data (last
visited Apr. 14, 2020) (select the “Producer Prices-Annual” link under the “Prices”
heading; click “Brazil,” “China,” and “United States of America” in the countries
field; select “Producer Price (USD/tonne)” in the elements field; select “Soybeans”
in the items field; select “2001” in the years field; click “Show Data”).
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For the Chinese soybean industry, the first shock of market
opening arrived in 2004.128 In the years leading up to 2004, the rapid
increase in demand for soy oil and the cheap beans from the U.S. had
created a rapidly expanding Chinese oil-crushing industry with firms
of all sizes.129 The international soybean chain at the time was such
that Chinese soy oil producers would pledge to buy beans from the
U.S. during the spring planting season; payments would be made in
the summer; and the beans would be shipped to China upon harvest
in the fall.130 When Chinese oil companies were pledging to buy U.S.
beans in the spring of 2004, prices in the U.S. reached an all-time
high. 131 When it was time to pay, however, prices had nearly
halved.132 Many Chinese companies decided to default.133 U.S. and
transnational traders sought arbitration at the London-based Grain
and Free Trade Association, which decided that despite the dramatic
price decrease, Chinese buyers should make the payments as agreed
upon in the spring.134
Soybean prices continued to fall and did not rebound until
2007. 135 The result was massive bankruptcies of Chinese soy oil
crushers and refineries and the subsequent takeover by major
international agro-companies such as ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis
Dreyfus, and Wilmar.136 By 2009, 80% of China’s soybean crushing
market and 60% of China’s soy oil refining market were controlled
by foreign firms.137
128

Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 178.
SOLIDARIDAD, CHINA’S SOY CRUSHING INDUSTRY IMPACTS ON THE GLOBAL
SUSTAINABILITY AGENDA 3–6, 10–16, https://www.solidaridadnetwork.org/sites/sol
idaridadnetwork.org/files/publications/China%20Soy%20report.pdf (last visited
Apr. 17, 2020).
130 Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 178.
131 Yang Mei (杨眉), 2004 Nian Dadou Weiji Shijian de Shimo (2004 年大豆危机
事件始末) [The Soybean Crisis in 2004], ZHONGGUO JINGJI ZHOUKAN (中国经济周
刊) [CHINA ECON. WEEKLY] (Feb. 18, 2008), http://finance.aweb.com.cn/2008/2/18/
2252008021810483390.html.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 178.
135 According to FAOSTAT, the average producer’s price for soybeans in the U.S.
was $270 per ton in 2003, $211 per ton in 2004, $208 per ton in 2005, $236 per ton
in 2006, and $371 per ton in 2007. FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.,
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select the “Producer Prices-Annual” link
under the “Prices” heading; click “United States of America” in the countries field;
select “Producer Price (USD/tonne)” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the
items field; select “2003,” “2004,” “2005,” “2006,” and “2007” in the years field;
click “Show Data”).
136 Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 170, 178.
137 Id. at 178; see also ZANG YUNPENG (臧云鹏), ZHONGGUO NONGYE ZHENXIANG:
WAIZI DAJU RUQIN ZHONGGUO NONGYE (中国农业真相：外资大举入侵中国农业)
[THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA’S AGRICULTURE: FOREIGN CAPITAL MASSIVELY INVADES
129
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For Chinese soybean farmers, market shock was a slower
and longer process of being competed out of production.138 With no
entry barriers, the steep price differences prompted soy processing
companies in China—many of which were foreign multinationals as
a result of the 2004 soybean crisis—to import beans from the U.S.
and Brazil.139 In 2002, China produced 1.19 times as many soybeans
as it imported. 140 In 2016, China imported approximately seven
times more soybeans than it produced domestically.141 Today, two
thirds of the world’s soybean exports go to China.142 Domestically,
however, soybean production shrank by approximately 20.4%
between 2002 and 2017.143 One study estimated that, between 2005
and 2010, 30% of soybean farmers from northeastern China (where
River District is located) had been pushed out of business and
became migrant workers in the city.144
Prior to the current U.S.-China trade war, soybeans were
“the largest U.S. export of any type to China,” contributing to
roughly 10% of all U.S. exports to China.145 While U.S. farmers
CHINA’S AGRICULTURE] (Peking Univ. Press 2013) (providing an in-depth analysis
of China’s “2004 soybean crisis”).
138 See infra text accompanying notes 139−44; see also supra Section II.C.ii.
(describing the lives of soybean farmers in River District); see also infra Section
IV.C. (describing the lives of soybean farmers in River District).
139 SOLIDARIDAD, supra note 129, at 6–8.
140 FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select
the “Crops” link under the “Production” heading; select “China” in the countries
field; select “Production” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items field;
select “2002” in the year field; click “Show Data”); Id. (select the “Crops and
livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “China” in the countries
field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items
field; select “2002” in the year field; click “Show Data”).
141 FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select
the “Crops” link under the “Production” heading; select “China” in the countries
field; select “Production” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items field;
select “2016” in the year field; click “Show Data”); Id. (select the “Crops and
livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “China” in the countries
field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items
field; select “2016” in the year field; click “Show Data”).
142 Soybeans Accounted for the Majority of U.S. and Brazil Agricultural Exports to
China in 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart
-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=93573 (last updated July 25, 2019).
143 FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select
the “Crops” link under the “Production” heading; select “China” in the countries
field; select “Production” in the elements field; select “Soybeans” in the items field;
select “2002” and “2017” in the year field; click “Show Data”).
144 Oliveira & Schneider, supra note 13, at 181 (citation omitted).
145 FRED GALE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., EIB-136, CHINA’S GROWING DEMAND FOR
AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS 7 (Feb. 2015), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publicat
ions/43939/eib-136.pdf?v=42058; Justin Choe et al., U.S. Soybean Exports to China
Crushed Amid Rising Trade Tensions, USITC EXECUTIVE BRIEFINGS ON TRADE, Aug.
2019, at 1–2, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/chinasoy
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worry that their “best customer” would turn to Latin America and
they would lose 300,000 soybean jobs,146 the life stories of tens of
millions of Chinese soybean farmers have remained hidden and
forgotten for the past two decades. This article makes some of their
stories visible.
C. Market Shock for China’s Dairy Industry: The 2008
Melamine Scandal
At the time China joined the WTO, the average producer’s
price for milk was lower in China than in the U.S. and other
developed countries; hence, trade opening had a limited impact in the
initial years of the country’s WTO accession.147 Between 2001 and
2008, China’s cow inventory more than doubled, and its milk
production tripled.148 Still, demand for dairy outpaced production,
and dairy imports increased.149
China’s dairy industry experienced dramatic market shock
in 2008 on three fronts. First, rising income levels—in the context
of China’s family planning policy, which limits births—were
concomitantly driving up the costs of agricultural labor.150 Average
income in agriculture more than doubled between 2001 and 2008.151
ebot.pdf (data on yearly U.S. soybean exports to China between 2016 and 2018);
Trade in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5700.html#2017 (last visited July 23, 2020) (data on trade with China
between 1985 and 2020); see also Hallie Gu & Naveen Thukral, Soy Source:
Brazil’s Share of Soybean Exports to China Hits Record, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2008),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-trade-soybeans/soy-source-braz
ils-share-of-soybean-exports-to-china-hits-record-idUSKBN1FE111.
146 Nathaniel Meyersohn, China Takes Aim at America’s Soybean Farmers,
CNNMONEY (Apr. 5, 2018), http://money.cnn.com/2018/04/05/news/economy/soy
beans-china-trade-us/index.html.
147 Fred Gale & Michael Jewison, China as Dairy Importer: Rising Milk Prices and
Production Costs, 19 INT’L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 189, 193 (2016).
148 2009 ZHONGGUO NAI YE NIANJIAN (2009 中国奶业年鉴) [2009 CHINA DAIRY
INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] tbl. 1-10 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2009) (end-of-the-year dairy
cow inventories between 1975 and 2008); China Statistical Yearbook 2009: 12-19
Output of Livestock Products, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020)
(providing China produced 10,255,000 tons of cow milk in 2001 and 35,558,000 in
2008).
149 BRAD GEHRKE & LESLEY AHMED, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, AGRICULTURAL
TRADE WITH CHINA: DAIRY IMPORT GIANT (2019).
150 Xiaobing Wang et al., Wage Growth, Landholding, and Mechanization in
Chinese Agriculture, 86 WORLD DEV. 30, 30 (2016).
151 China Statistical Yearbook 2002: 5-22 Average Wage of Staff and Workers by
Sector, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/sta
tisticaldata/yearlydata/YB2002e/ml/indexE.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020)
(providing that in 2001, the average wage of a worker in the “Farming, Forestry
Animal Husbandry, and Fishery” sector was 5,741 Yuan); China Statistical
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This, in conjunction with rising input costs, resulted in small dairy
farmers losing competitiveness to farmers in major dairy exporting
countries such as the U.S.152
Second, in April 2008, China signed a free trade agreement
(“FTA”) with New Zealand, the world’s leading dairy exporter.153
The FTA required China to eliminate tariffs on many dairy imports
in 2012 and all dairy (and other) imports from New Zealand in
2019.154 This FTA ushered in an era of massive dairy imports from
New Zealand. Today, New Zealand is China’s second largest dairy
exporter, accounting for 21.5% of China’s total dairy imports (the
European Union as a block is China’s largest dairy exporter,
constituting 48.4% of China’s total dairy imports).155
Third, the biggest—and certainly the most widely
reported—food safety disaster in contemporary China took place in
late 2008, tanking China’s rapidly growing dairy industry.156 At the
time the scandal broke out, China’s inadequate dairy quality
inspection system used nitrogen as a proxy for protein and tested
milk quality by checking the nitrogen level in the milk.157 Taking
advantage of this rudimentary system, dairy merchants and farmers
added water and melamine—a toxic, nitrogen-rich chemical
compound—to raw milk to increase volume.158 Nationally, it was
found out that melamine-contaminated milk powder from twentytwo Chinese manufacturers poisoned over 290,000 people (primarily
infants), caused tens of thousands of hospitalizations, and at least six

Yearbook 2009: 4-26 Average Wage of Staff and Workers by Sector and Region,
NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/ind
exeh.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020) (providing that in 2008, the average wage of a
worker in the “Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery” sector was
12,958 Yuan). See also Xiaobing Wang et al., supra note 150, at 33 (Figure 2
showing a similar trend of wage growth for on-farm labor in agricultural production
in China).
152 Gale & Jewison, supra note 147, at 193.
153 Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of
China and the Government of New Zealand, China-N.Z., annex 1, pt. A, Apr. 7,
2008.
154 Id.
155 These numbers are calculated based on the dairy import data in 2018 Nian 1-12
Yue Zhongguo Ruzhipin Jinchukou Tongji (2018 年 1－12 月中国乳制品进出口统
计) [China’s Dairy Import and Export Statistics Between January and December of
2018], AOZHOU CAIJING JIANWEN (澳洲财经见闻) [AUSTRALIAN FIN. NEWS] (Mar.
2, 2019), https://afndaily.com/36852.
156 Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 464.
157 Id.
158 Id.
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infant deaths.159 Sanlu, China’s then largest milk powder processor,
declared bankruptcy.160 Two other dairy giants, Mengniu and Yili,
saw their sales drop by 80% in a matter of days, and the two
combined saw their 2008 revenue drop by half a billion dollars.161
Scores of people, including the former CEO of Sanlu and six highranking government officials, received criminal punishments
ranging from jail terms to the death penalty.162
Researchers and the Chinese government attribute this food
disaster to the highly fragmented and grossly under-regulated nature
of China’s milk supply chain.163 In 2008, 42.9% of China’s dairy
cows were raised on farms with fewer than ten cows and 64% of
China’s dairy cows were raised on farms with fewer than twenty
cows.164 60% of the raw milk supply to Chinese dairy processing
companies was collected from individual farms, and 25% of the
supply was collected from scattered dairy plots and milk collecting
stations. 165 Only 14% of the milking stations had a hygiene
license.166 There were no national quality standards for raw milk or
derivative products, and the government had delegated inspection
responsibilities to major dairy companies.167 Hence, in a world with
159

Id.; Andrew Jacobs, China to Investigate French Company Over Claims of
Tainted Formula, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/1
3/world/asia/13milk.html?_r=1&ref=asia.
160 Gao Xingxiang (高兴翔), Sanlu Wangguo Fenbenglixi, Yijia Pochan Baozhu
Quan Hangye (三鹿王国分崩离析，一家破产保住全行业) [Sanlu Kingdom
Disintegrates, Bankruptcy of One Preserves an Entire Industry], SHIDAI ZHOUBAO
(时代周报) [THE TIME WEEKLY] (Jan. 1, 2009), http://news.sohu.com/20090101/n2
61527058.shtml.
161 Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 464.
162 See Wu Heng (吴恒), Sanlu Sanjuqingan Du Naifen Shijian Zeren Ren Jin Hezai?
(三鹿三聚氰胺毒奶粉事件责任人今何在？) [Where Are the Persons Responsible
for the Sanlu Melamine Poison Milk Powder Incident?], PENGPAI (澎湃) [SURGING]
(Aug. 3, 2014), http://m.thepaper.cn/renmin_prom.jsp?contid=1259370&from=ren
min (providing a list of high-profile responsible parties for the melamine scandal).
163
Guixia Qian et al., China’s Dairy Crisis: Impacts, Causes and Policy
Implications for a Sustainable Dairy Industry, 18 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. &
WORLD ECOLOGY 434, 438 (2011); Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 464; Guowuyuan
(国务院) [State Council], Nai Ye Zhengdun He Zhenxing Guihua Gangyao (奶业整
顿 和 振 兴 规 划 纲 要 ) [Planning Guidelines for the Reorganization and
Revitalization of the Dairy Industry], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG
RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008
-11/19/content_1154518.htm.
164 H. Ma et al., The Evolution of Productivity Performance on China’s Dairy
Farms in the New Millennium, 95 J. DAIRY SCI. 7074, 7076 (2012); 2014 ZHONGGUO
NAI YE NIANJIAN (2014 中国奶业年鉴) [2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK]
32 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2014).
165 Qian et al., supra note 163, at 438.
166 Id. at 438, 439.
167 Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 467.
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no regulations, high fragmentation, rapidly rising demand, unlimited
profit seeking, and easy availability of melamine in local stores,
adulterating milk with water and melamine became a “latent rule” in
China’s burgeoning dairy industry.168
True and revelatory as it is, the above analysis misses the
influence of trade opening on China’s dairy market structure. As
China’s raw milk prices exceeded the prices in the U.S. and New
Zealand in 2008, Chinese dairy companies—many of which had
major foreign investors—supplemented and even substituted raw
domestic milk with cheap imported milk powder to make liquid milk
and yogurt.169 The Chinese state’s failure to enact labeling laws or
dairy regulations gave these companies free rein to engage in such
activities.170 Liquid milk aside, China almost doubled its imports of
milk powder between 2001 and 2008. 171 The rapid increase of
imports limited the room for the expansion of domestically produced
milk powder, which in turn limited demand for raw milk.
Foreign competition and investments also led to a steady
restructuring of China’s dairy processing industry. 172 Small firms
were being pushed out, large firms were becoming even larger, and
in 2007, the top four dairy companies produced and sold nearly half
of all of the milk products in China.173
High concentration of the dairy processing sector combined
with high fragmentation of the dairy producing sector resulted in an
extremely uneven distribution of bargaining power and, hence, of
168

Id.; Qian et al., supra note 163, at 436.
Wang Yongkang (王永康), Woguo Yuanliao Nai de Dingjia Ying Naru Shichang
Jingji he Fazhi Guanli de Guidao—Dui Dangqian Woguo Yuanliao Nai Shougou
Wenti de Yixie Sikao (我国原料奶的定价应纳入市场经济和法制管理的轨道—
—对当前我国原料奶收购问题的一些思考) [The Pricing of Domestic Raw Milk
Should Be Incorporated in the Track of the Market Economy and Legal Regulation],
in DI QI JIE ZHONGGUO NAIYE DAHUI LUNWEN JI (第七届中国奶业大会论文集) [A
COLLECTION OF PAPERS FROM THE SEVENTH CHINA DAIRY CONFERENCE] 31−2
(2016). Between 2002 and June 2008, eight Chinese dairy processing companies
had received over 576 million US dollars of capital investment from multinational
dairy producers and investment corporations. Qian Guixia (钱贵霞) & Xie Jing (解
晶), Zhongguo Yuanliao Nai Gongqiu Maodun Ji Qi Yingxiang Jiexi (中国原料奶
供求矛盾及其影响解析) [Analysis on the Contradiction of Supply and Demand of
Raw Milk in China and its Influence], 42 NEIMENGGU DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE
SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) (内蒙古大学学报(哲学社会科学版)) [J. INNER MONG. U.
(PHIL. & SOC. SCI.)] 58, 62 (2010).
170 Wang Yongkang, supra note 169, at 32.
171
Qingbin Wang et al., China’s Dairy Markets: Trends, Disparities, and
Implications for Trade, 2 CHINA AGRIC. ECON. REV. 356, 366 (2010).
172 Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 465.
173 Id.
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profits between dairy farmers and processing companies. While the
ratios of investments in dairy production, processing, and retailing
sectors were 7.5 to 1.5 to 1 (respectively), the ratios of profits were
1 to 3.5 to 5.5 (respectively).174 The disproportionate market power
allowed major dairy processing companies to suppress the price of
raw milk as a way to prolong their competitiveness vis-à-vis
imported milk powder.175 Two scholars observed that on the eve of
the 2008 melamine milk scandal:
Economies of scale combined with marketing power
in both input and output markets have allowed the
major dairy companies to pursue aggressive growth
strategies. Their size has given them a level of
economic importance such that small dairy farmers,
milk collection stations and even governments
(particularly provincial and local) have developed a
state of dependency on their continued profitability
and growth.176
The suppressed producers’ price, rising costs of inputs, and
inherently high risks of dairy production pushed many small dairy
farmers out of business.177 In 2002, 45% of China’s dairy cows were
raised on farms with fewer than five cows.178 In 2008, only 32% of
China’s cows were raised on farms with fewer than five cows.179 For
those who struggled to remain in the dairy production business,
melamine became the easiest available means of cost reduction.
Melamine was their attempt to modify the existing scheme of profit
sharing, even if that attempt would lead to the collapse of China’s
dairy industry, themselves included.
***
For post-WTO China, milk and soybeans embody both the
benefits and the costs of globalization. China has become a world
leading milk producer, consumer, and importer. Most of the world’s
soybeans are now produced outside China, and most of the world’s
soybean exports are for Chinese consumption. As the historically
“barbarian” milk becomes more Chinese and the historically
“Chinese” soybean becomes more global (more American and Latin
174
175
176
177
178
179

Qian Guixia & Xie Jing, supra note 169, at 63.
Id. at 62–64.
Xiu & Klein, supra note 65, at 465.
Id. at 466.
2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 32 tbl. 2-1.
Id.
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American, to be precise), globalization is also pitting the people who
produce or process milk and soybeans against each other. On the one
hand, soybean farmers in the U.S. and Brazil and dairy farmers and
companies in the U.S., Europe, and New Zealand rejoice in the vast
newfound Chinese market and pump up their production. On the
other hand, Chinese soybean and dairy farmers and companies
agonize over newly arrived foreign competition, scramble to cut
costs, or else are pushed out of business.
IV. Government Response: State-Led Industrial Policy
A. Central State Response: Agricultural Industrialization
Through Property Reform
The Chinese government’s agricultural reports and policies
suggest that it attributes Chinese farmers’ lack of competitiveness to
the small farm size created by HRS; that the small size prevents the
realization of economies of scale and in particular, mechanization.180
The average farm size in China is 0.52 hectare (or 1.3 acres).181 The
average farm size in the U.S. is about 176 hectares (or 434 acres).182
Dairy operations have also been small. In 2008, less than one fifth
of China’s dairy cows were raised on farms with more than 100 head
of cattle.183 The diseconomy of small scale is further exacerbated by
the rising cost of labor. Since 2009, the cost of labor has risen
exponentially more than the costs of other agricultural inputs in

180

See Quanguo Nongye Kechixu Fazhan Guihua (2015-2030 Nian) (全国农业可
持续发展规划(2015-2030 年)) [National Agricultural Sustainable Development
Plan (2015-2030)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Agric. et al., May 20, 2015,
effective May 20, 2015) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Oct. 10, 2015, at 28 [hereinafter
National Agricultural Development Plan] (promoting larger-scale operations for all
agricultural activities, including crop cultivation, animal husbandry, and fisheries;
giving special treatment to operations 10-15 times the size of an average household
farm under HRS).
181 According to Vice Minister of Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs, the
average size of family farms in China in 2019 was 7.8 mu, or 0.52 hectare, and 210
million out of the 230 rural families in China were operating a farm smaller than 10
mu (or 0.67 hectare) of land. Yu Wenjing (于文静) and Dong Jun (董峻), Quanguo
98% Yishang de Nongye Jingying Zhuti Rengshi Xiao Nonghu (全国 98%以上的农
业经营主体仍是小农户) [98% of China’s Agricultural Operators Are Still Small
Rural Families], XINHUA WANG ( 新 华 网 ) [XINHUA NEWS] (Mar. 1, 2019),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-03/01/c_1210071071.htm. Given China’s
highly egalitarian landholding created by HRS, the average size of family farms is
the best available approximate for the average farm size in China.
182 NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., VOL. 1, GEOGRAPHIC
AREA SERIES, PT. 51, 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 92 tbl.65 (2012).
183 2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 32.
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China.184 Table 1 illustrates the competitiveness of U.S. soybeans
over Chinese soybeans.185
2010

2015

China

US

China

US

Total Production Costs

¥301

¥201

¥488

¥227

Cost of Labor

¥81

¥10

¥156

¥11

Costs of Other
Variable Inputs

¥112

¥70

¥146

¥82

Table 1. “Average Costs of Producing 100 kg of Soybeans”

It is in this context that the Chinese government views
scaling up and mechanization as necessary for Chinese farmers to
regain competitiveness.186 Once again, the Chinese state is relying
on property reform to accomplish these goals.
i. Property Reform
This new round of property reform consists of three steps.
The first step is legalizing and simplifying for-profit agricultural land
transfers. Although the CCP lengthened agricultural land tenure to
thirty years per redistribution and allowed for-profit land transfers in
as early as 1993, that decision was made in a policy document rather
than in legislation.187 In 2002, a year after China’s WTO entry, the
National People’s Congress (China’s national legislature) enacted
the Rural Land Contract Law to legalize the 1993 policy.188 Under
the law, rural households can assign or sublet their thirty-year
agricultural land tenure to other growers, including enterprises, or

184

See Gale & Jewison, supra note 147, at 194 fig. 3.
NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N OF CHINA, CHINA YEARBOOK ON COSTS AND
PROFITS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 27, 626 (2016).
186 National Agricultural Development Plan, supra note 180; see Xinhua She (新华
社 ) [Xinhua News Agency], Quanguo Nongzuowu Geng Zhong Shou Zonghe
Jixiehua lü Chaoguo 67% (全国农作物耕种收综合机械化率超过 67%) [The
Comprehensive Mechanization Rate of Crop Cultivation and Harvesting
Nationwide Exceeds 67%], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN
ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Jan. 19, 2019), http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2019
-01/19/content_5359371.htm.
187 See Thomas Vendryes, Land Rights in Rural China Since 1978, 4 CHINA
PERSPECTIVES 87, 89 (2010).
188 Id. at 89–90.
185
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use it as capital to join a corporate grower and become a
shareholder.189
In China, intellectuals hotly debate rural land reform. Some
argue that private and freely alienable property rights can enhance
efficiency and encourage investment. 190
Others fear that
privatization and alienability (including the ability to serve as
security) would lead to rural dispossession and unemployment and
threaten social stability.191 The Chinese state seems to have taken a
middle road approach. On the one hand, the 2002 Rural Land
Contract Law (and subsequent legislation) lets the market allocate
agricultural land on a non-permanent basis.192 On the other hand, the
refusal to recognize private land ownership, sales, and mortgages is
designed to prevent systemic landlessness and social dislocation.193
The second step of the reform continues to reflect the
Chinese state’s middle-ground stance. Despite various changes to
increase the alienability of rural land tenure, Chinese law forbids
household farmers to secure bank loans with their land rights, out of
fear that banks will dispossess them of land.194 On the other hand,
the CCP-ruled government now allows agricultural co-ops and other

189

See Rural Land Contract Law, supra note 83, arts. 10, 32, 36, 42.
See generally WEN GUANZHONG (文贯中), WUMIN WUDI: CHENGSHIHUA, TUDI
ZHIDU, YU HUJI ZHIDU DE NEIZAI LUOJI (吾民无地：城镇化、土地制度和户籍制
度的内在逻辑) [WE HAVE NO LAND: THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF URBANIZATION LAND
SYSTEM AND HOUSEHOLD REGISTRATION SYSTEM] (2014); see James Wen & Jinwu
Xiong, The Hukou and Land Tenure Systems as Two Middle Income Traps – The
Case of Modern China, 9 FRONTIERS OF ECON. IN CHINA 438, 441 (2014); see
generally ZHOU QIREN (周其仁), CHENGXIANG ZHONGGUO: XIUDING BAN (城乡中
国：修订版) [RURAL-URBAN CHINA: REVISED EDITION] (2013); Yu Jianrong (于建
嵘) & Chen Zhiwu (陈志武), Ba Diquan Huangei Nongmin: see generally Yu
Jianrong Duihua Chen Zhiwu (把地权还给农民：于建嵘对话陈志武) [Return
Land Rights to Farmers: Yu Jianrong in Dialog with Chen Zhiwu], 2 DONGNAN
XUESHU (东南学术) [SOUTHEAST ACAD. RES.] 12 (2008).
191 See generally CHINA'S PEASANT AGRICULTURE AND RURAL SOCIETY, supra note
87; HO, supra note 81, at 11; Tiejun Wen (温铁军), Woguo Weishenme Buneng
Shixing Nongcun Tudi Siyouhua (我国为什么不能实行农村土地私有化) [Why
Can’t China Implement Private Landownership], 7 CAIJING JIE (财经界) [MONEY
CHINA] 43–46 (2015); see generally XUEFENG HE (贺雪峰), DI QUAN DE LUOJI:
ZHONGGUO NONGCUN TUDI ZHIDU QUXIANG HECHU? (地权的逻辑：中国农村土
地制度去向何处) [THE LOGIC OF LAND RIGHTS: WHICH DIRECTION FOR CHINESE
RURAL LAND POLICY?] (2013); see generally HUA SHENG (华生), CHENGSHIHUA
ZHUANXING HE TUDI XIANJING ( 城 市 化 转 型 和 土 地 陷 阱 ) [URBANIZATION
TRANSITION AND LAND TRAP] (2013).
192 See Vendryes, supra note 187, at 90.
193 See Tiejun Wen, supra note 191.
194 Wuquanfa (物权法) [Property Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar.
16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 184 (2).
190
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agricultural companies that sublet land from household farmers to
secure bank loans with these commercial subleases.195
This arrangement may appear to violate the time-honored
property principle, nemo potest plus juris ad alium transferre quam
ipse habet (“[n]o one can transfer to another a greater right than he
himself (actually) has”).196 The Chinese state explains this anomaly
with a three-tier land right structure: ownership (suoyouquan, 所有
权), the right to contract land (chengbaoquan, 承包权), and the right
to farm/manage land (jingyingquan, 经营权).197 Ownership belongs
to the state or a rural collective as a fundamental principle of
socialism. 198 The right to contract land is an inalienable
socioeconomic entitlement for members of the collective (or workers
of State Farms) and is designed to protect them from permanent land
dispossession and community dislocation. 199
The right to
farm/manage land is an alienable property right that any agricultural
actor can acquire at a price.200 It is this management right that can
be transferred, used as capital for joining a co-op, or used as security
for obtaining a loan.201 It is this right that the Chinese state hopes
will transform China’s agriculture from small-scale, nonmechanized household farming to large-scale, mechanized corporate
farming.202
A third major reconfiguration of property rights is the
enactment of the 2006 Law on Specialized Farmers’ Cooperatives,
which allows and encourages household farmers to scale up
agriculture by using land rights as capital to set up corporate co195

See Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gaige Ruogan Zhongda
Wenti de Jueding (中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) [Decision
on Certain Major Issues Concerning the Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms]
(adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China on Nov. 12, 2013).
196 Nemo Potest Plus Juris Ad Alienum Transferre Quam Ipse Habet, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). It is called nemo dat quod non habet in common law.
Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
197 Xinhua She (新华社) [Xinhua News Agency], Guanyu Wanshan Nongcun Tudi
Suoyouquan Chengbaoquan Jingyingquan Fenzhi Banfa de Yijian (关于完善农村
土地所有权承包权经营权分置办法的意见) [General Office of the CPC Central
Committee About Perfecting the Management Right of Rural Land Ownership
Contracting Right: Opinions on the Division Method], ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO ZHONG YANG RENMIN ZHENG FU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府)
[THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Oct. 30, 2016),
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_5133019.htm.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
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ops. 203 The hoped-for advantage of the co-op is that household
farmers can reap the benefits of mechanization and economies of
scale without being dispossessed.204 They can leave their land to the
co-op, seek a second source of income, and receive annual profits
from the co-op.205
To complement the property reform, the Chinese
government also gives financial support to agricultural producers to
help them scale up and mechanize. 206 The Chinese government
subsidizes many aspects of agricultural production, including
machine purchases, improved seeds, irrigation, plot leveling and
combination, price support for selected grains, and special awards for
larger-scale farms. 207 A few numbers are illustrative. Since the
Chinese government began to subsidize farm equipment purchases
in 2004, by the end of 2017 it had increased this subsidy 266-fold,
with a total accumulation of ¥187 billion ($26 billion) over the
fourteen years.208 The Chinese government also vows to transform
more than half of the country’s protected farmland into large,
irrigated plots suitable for machine operation by 2020.209
To encourage the scaling up of dairy farms, the Chinese
government subsidizes the construction of larger dairy farms,
cooperatives, and compounds.210 Between 2008 and 2016, billions
See Chen Yuqing, Issues on Standardization of Farmers’ Cooperatives in China,
9 ASIAN AGRIC. RES. 34, 34 (2017).
204 Id.
205 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongmin Zhuanye Hezuoshe Fa (中华人民
共和国农民专业合作社法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Farmers’
Professional Cooperatives] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006, effective July 1, 2007) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Dec. 20,
2006, at 35, arts. 3–5, 14, 16.
206 Soumaya Bermouna & Junrong Li, China's Agricultural Project Finance and
Support Policies: The Framework of China's Major Agricultural Subsidies, 9 EUR.
FOOD & FEED L. REV. 171, 173 (2014); see also National Agricultural Development
Plan, supra note 180.
207 Bermouna & Li, supra note 206, at 173.
208 Wang Xuqin ( 王 许 沁 ) et al., Nongji Gouzhi Butie Zhengce: Xiaoguo yu
Xiaolü―Jiyu Jili Xiaoying yu Jichu Xiaoying Shijiao (农机购置补贴政策：效果
与效率——基于激励效应与挤出效应视角) [The Policy of Farm Equipment
Purchase Subsidy: Effects and Efficiency―From the Perspectives of the Incentive
Effect and the Crowding Out Effect], ZHONGGUO NONGCUN GUANCHA (中国农村观
察) [CHINA RURAL SURV.], no. 2, 2018, at 1, 2.
209 Yangshi Wang (央视网) [CCTV], Guotu Ziyuan Bu: Touzi 6000 Yi Yuan Jian
Gao Biaozhun Jiben Nongtian (国土资源部：投资 6000 亿元建高标准基本农田)
[Ministry of Land and Resource: Invest 600 Billion Yuan to Build High-Standard
Basic Farmland], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZIRAN ZIYUAN BU (中华人民共
和国自然资源部) [MINISTRY OF NAT. RES. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA]
(June 26, 2012), http://vod.mnr.gov.cn/spxw/201206/t20120626_1114028.htm.
210 2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 47.
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of Yuan of subsidies were disbursed to thousands of the country’s
largest dairy farms.211
ii. Results
In 2002, only 20.6% of China’s rice and 1.7% of China’s
corn were harvested by machines.212 In 2018, over 80% of all major
grains and over 67% of all agricultural crops were planted, plowed,
and harvested by machines. 213 In 1996, only 2.6% of China’s
agricultural land changed hands from the original household farm
under HRS to another farm.214 In 2018, 39% of China’s agricultural
land was transferred by the original household farm to another
farming entity.215 In other words, two fifths of China’s family farms
have exited agricultural production. The small, non-mechanized,
highly egalitarian, “every rural family is a farm” model created by
HRS is falling apart.
The changes in China’s dairy industry are all the more
profound. In 2008, 69% of China’s dairy cows were raised on farms
with fewer than twenty cows.216 By the end of 2018, 62% of China’s
dairy cows were raised on farms with more than one hundred
cows.217

2013 ZHONGGUO NAI YE NIANJIAN (2013 中国奶业年鉴) [2013 CHINA DAIRY
INDUSTRY YEARBOOK] 41 (Ministry of Agric. ed., 2013); 2014 CHINA DAIRY
INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 47; CHINA AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK 117
(2016); CHINA AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK 138 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 CHINA
AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK].
212 NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N OF CHINA, QUANGUO GAO BIAOZHUN
NONGTIAN JIANSHE ZONGTI GUIHUA (全国高标准农田建设总体规划) [NATIONAL
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF HIGH STANDARD AGRICULTURAL
LAND] 4 (2013).
213 Xinhua She, supra note 186.
214 Lanpishu: Quanguo Nongdi Liuzhuan Tisu Jingti “Feilianghua” Jiaju (蓝皮书：
全国农地流转提速警惕“非粮化”加剧) [Blue Paper: National Agricultural Land
Transfers Accelerate, Caution for Exacerbating “Non-Grainification”], DIYI
CAIJING (第一财经) [FIRST FIN.] (May 9, 2016), https://www.yicai.com/news/50108
52.html.
215 Wanzi Changwen Jiedu Nongcun Tudi Liuzhuan Ruhe Tuidong San Si Xian
Chengshi Loushi Fazhan (万字长文解读农村土地流转如何推动三四线城市楼
市 发 展 ) [Ten-Thousand-Word-Long Article Explains How Agricultural Land
Transfers Propel Real Estate Development in Third-and-Fourth-Tier Cities],
TENGXUN (腾讯) [TENCENT] (Aug. 11, 2019), https://new.qq.com/omn/20190811/20
190811A038WD00.html.
216 2014 CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY YEARBOOK, supra note 164, at 32.
217 Zhonguo Naiye 70 Nian Faxhan Huihuang Chengjiu (中国奶业 70 年发展辉煌
成 就 ) [Major Accomplishments of China’s Dairy Industry in 70 Years of
Development], ZHONGGUO NAIYE XIEHUI (中国奶业协会) [CHINA DAIRY ASS’N]
(June 6, 2019), http://www.dac.com.cn/read/newztyj-19060620001110210561.jhtm.
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Despite these changes, the trade and market dynamics that
characterized the soybean and dairy industries in the 2000s
continued. Between 2000 and 2016, China’s soybean imports
increased by nearly seven-fold. 218 With drastically lowered tariff
rates,219 China’s dairy imports increased in weight by thirteen-fold
and in value by fifty-fold between 2000 and 2018.220 According to a
2019 study of global dairy competitiveness, the evaluations for China
are negative across the board.221
Foreign competition on the one hand and foreign investment
on the other continue to push for higher concentrations of ever-larger
players in China’s dairy processing industry. In 2016 in China, eight
out of the nine most popular milk powder products were foreign
brands,222 and five out of the ten largest dairy processing companies
were foreign-owned.223 China’s top eight dairy companies process
over 70% of the domestically produced raw milk. 224 The
disproportionate power continues to allow dairy companies to set
their own milk standards, decide the prices at which they purchase
milk from farmers, and discriminate against small dairy farmers—
just as they did prior to 2008.225
218

FAOSTAT, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data (select
the “Crops and livestock products” link under the “Trade” heading; select “China”
in the countries field; select “Import Quantity” in the elements field; select
“Soybeans” in the items field; select “2000” and “2016” in the year field; click
“Show Data”).
219 In 2015, for example, China’s average applied tariff rate for dairy was less than
one eighth Japan’s rate and less than one fifth the average world rate. Wang Guang
(王广) & Feng Qi (冯启), Zhongguo Ruye de Xianshi Yali Yu Zhanlue Jiyu (中国乳
业的现实压力与战略机遇) [Practical Pressures and Strategic Opportunities of the
Chinese Dairy Industry], 4 RUPIN YU RENLEI (乳品与人类) [DAIRY AND HUMANITY]
4, 10 (2017).
220 Liu Lin ( 刘 琳 ), Zhongguo de Naiye ( 中 国 的 奶 业 ) [China’s Dairy], 18
ZHONGGUO XUMUYE (中国畜牧业) [CHINESE ANIMAL HUSBANDRY] 17, 25 (2019).
221 Jiang Bing et al. (姜冰等), Shijie Ruye Shengchan ji Maoyi Geju Fenxi—Jianlun
Zhongguo Ruye Guoji Jingzhengli (世界乳业生产及贸易格局分析——兼论中国
乳业国际竞争力) [World Dairy Production and Trade Situation Analysis—Also a
Discussion on the International Competitiveness of the Chinese Dairy Industry], 47
ZHONGGUO RUPIN GONGYE (中国乳品工业) [CHINA DAIRY INDUSTRY] 36, 39–41
(2019).
222 Wang Guang & Feng Qi, supra note 219, at 8.
223 ZHONGGUO NAIYE XIEHUI (中国奶业协会) [CHINA DAIRY ASS’N], 2014-2015
NIAN RU ZHIPIN HANGYE FAZHAN ZHUANGKUANG YANJIU (2014-2015 年乳制品行
业发展状况研究) [2014-2015 DAIRY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT STUDY] 10, 12, 16
(2016) [hereinafter 2014-2015 DAIRY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT STUDY].
224 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CHINA’S DAIRY IMPORTS INCREASE TO MEET GROWING
DEMAND, BUT U.S.-ORIGIN PRODUCTS FACE STRONG HEADWINDS 3 (2018),
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filena
me=Dairy%20and%20Products%20Annual_Beijing_China%20-%20Peoples%20
Republic%20of_10-17-2018.pdf.
225 Wang Yongkang, supra note 169, at 32; Qian et al., supra note 163, at 437.
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Global competition, high concentration in the processing
industry, rising costs of labor and animal feed, and, in recent years,
heightened environmental regulations continue to push small dairy
farmers out of business and pressure existing farms to relocate,
expand, or consolidate.226 According to the USDA, half of the dairy
farms near Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai were closed down in
2019.227
B. Agricultural Industrialization in Mountain County228
Due to land scarcity, isolation from the outside world, and a
lack of industry and commerce, Mountain County was historically
poor and agrarian. County chronicles record that in 1985, 92% of
the local workforce was in agriculture, and more than 60% of rural
households lived below the national poverty line. Farming was
small-scale, subsistent, and used very little modern technology.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, poverty drove many young men
and women to work as migrant workers in factories on the east coast.
In the years that followed, the decline of agriculture and the rise of
industry, both in Mountain County and in China at large, continued
to push rural young people away from the farm. Today, about 50%
of the rural labor force works outside of the county. For those who
remain in the county, most engage in off-farm work. Full-time
farmers are now a small minority. They tend to be older, often in
their late fifties, sixties, or early seventies, and they take up the land
left by their non-farming family members and relatives.
Not surprisingly, Mountain County’s agricultural workforce
is increasingly comprised of elderly people. In the eleven villages
where I did fieldwork, of a total population of over thirty thousand,
there were almost no farmers under the age of forty. Many families
had handed the land to older relatives to farm. Some families had
deserted the land altogether, often because their land was high up on
the hillside and harder to farm with machines. My interlocutors—
ranging from farmers to migrant workers, and from village cadres to
county officials—all realized that as traditional household farming is
unable to sustain basic living, as rural youths aspire to live an urban
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 224, at 2; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GAIN REPORT
CH19042, HIGHER PROFITS SUPPORT INCREASED FLUID MILK PRODUCTION 1–3
(2019) [hereinafter HIGHER PROFITS SUPPORT INCREASED FLUID MILK PRODUCTION]
227 HIGHER P ROFITS SUPPORT INCREASED FLUID MILK PRODUCTION, supra note 226,
at 2.
228 The statements made in this section rely on the Author’s own fieldwork and
historical research in Mountain County.
226

NO.

118

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.16

life, and as today’s farmers are about to become too old to farm,
agriculture in Mountain County will soon face an existential crisis.
Who will farm the land tomorrow?
Facing this impending crisis, agricultural industrialization
came to be viewed by the county government as a potential solution.
Starting in the early-2000s, the county government promoted
commercial vegetable farming in several highly mountainous
townships: disseminating farming knowledge; supplying seeds,
chemicals, and basic technology support; and soliciting urban market
avenues. Starting around 2010, the government also pushed for
“scale farming” (“规模经营”) projects in or near flat areas. Officials
were appointed to seek agricultural companies and cooperatives to
sublet land from local villagers and start a commercial farm. The
government hoped that by scaling up, commercializing, and
corporatizing agricultural production, profits would rise to a level
that would attract some entrepreneurs to invest in farming.
Because of the mountainous terrain, entrepreneurial farms in
Mountain County mostly specialized in fruits, teas, tree nuts,
mushrooms, vegetables, and organic rice. Mountain County now has
a lively industry specializing in high-altitude mountain vegetables,
tea, and fungi. Soybean production has been phased out in the
county. So have wheat and corn. On the other hand, dairy has
entered most rural and urban households in the forms of baby
formula, milk powder, ultra-pasteurized milk packages, refrigerated
milk, or yogurt.
C. Agricultural Industrialization in River District229
Before 2009, land in River District was leased to individual
household farmers or farming teams for specific durations; the latter
would pay rent to the Farm administration, farm the land, and keep
the remaining profits. Between 2009 and 2012, without consulting
or compensating the local residents, the District administration
terminated or refused to renew leases to individual farmers or
farming teams. In their place, the administration established
specialized agricultural producers’ co-ops to farm the land. Exfarmers were entitled to buy a small guaranteed number of “land
shares” in the co-op at prices set by the Farm administration as well
as any remaining shares at the market rate, and they were entitled to
receive dividends based on their shares. The co-op was managed by
The statements made in this section rely on the Author’s own fieldwork and
historical research in River District.
229
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Unit officials and technicians appointed or recruited by the Farm
administration. Unit officials hired individual machine owners and
temporary laborers to work the land.
To accompany the vastly larger scale of production, the
District administration ordered large agricultural machines from both
domestic manufacturers and manufacturers in the U.S. and Europe.
These machines were then sold to private individuals with
government subsidies.
In the past, most residents lived in single-story brick houses
in their Unit near the land. Between 2009 and 2013, almost all rural
neighborhoods in the District were demolished, the land was
reclaimed for farming, and all of the residents were required to buy
and move into newly built apartments in the Farm’s urban center.
Just as with compulsory cooperatization, the District administration
did not consult the local residents. On the one hand, compulsory
urbanization pushed ex-farmers physically and psychologically away
from the land, thus making it harder for them to resist
cooperatization. On the other hand, it created more convenient living
spaces and urban job opportunities for ex-farmers, making it easier
for them to adjust to non-farming life.
Compulsory cooperatization and urbanization changed the
lives of River District residents in fundamental ways. It forced the
overwhelming majority of farmers off of the land and into the city.
It eliminated their rural, semi-subsistent way of life and subjected
them to an urban, exclusively market-based way of living. Residents
who were able to find jobs welcomed or accepted the changes. Those
who could not find reliable jobs resented higher costs of living,
heightened wealth inequality, and uncertainties of life revolving
around the market. For the few of those who strongly resisted the
changes and who were brave enough to stage a petition or protest in
Beijing during major national political events, the District
administration required each State Farm to send officials to Beijing
to catch them at train stations and long-distance bus stations and send
them back. These officials used a variety of methods—from
calculated negotiation and compromise, to threats of violence,
detention, and criminal punishment, to actual violence, detention,
and court-sentenced punishment.
Alongside these changes was a big push to expand the local
dairy industry. Although the 2008 melamine scandal devastated
China’s dairy giants, it also catapulted two dairy processing
companies in Heilongjiang—Wonderson and Feihe—from being
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obscure local players to being national champions. 230 When
government inspections did not find melamine in their products,
panicked consumers switched from national brands to them. 231
Seizing this opportunity, the Heilongjiang provincial government
sought to turn the province into a leading dairy producer and
processor.232 The rest of this section explains how this development
strategy was implemented in River District.
i. Forced Concentration and Scaling Up
In the past, dairy farmers in River District kept cows in a
shed in their yard. The cows grazed on state-owned land during the
summer and were fed corn and soybean stalks collected from
farmers’ own fields during colder seasons. Milking was done either
at a milking station miles away or manually by the farmers
themselves, and the milk was sold to a middleman at the milking
station or in a market center.
Following the central government’s policy, the District
administration constructed dairy compounds equipped with
mechanized milking stations, running water, and staff members to
organize feed provision and manage veterinary affairs. Both carrots
and sticks were used to push farmers to move their cows to the
compounds. Farmers could use the sheds for free. Milking was done
by machines right in the compound, and Wonderson’s milk truck
would come every day to buy the milk. If the purchasing price fell
Lousie Moon, Foreign Brands Still Dominate as Parents Do Not Trust China’s
Home-grown Baby Milk Formula Makers 12 Years on From Melamine Milk Scandal,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 22, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/business/com
panies/article/3051808/foreign-brands-still-dominate-parents-do-not-trust-chinas-h
ome.
231 Wang Chunyu (王春雨), “Wan Da Shan” Ying You Er Peifang Naifen Wei Jian
Chu Sanjuqingan (“完达山”婴幼儿配方奶粉未检出三聚氰胺) [Melamine Not
Found in “Wandashan” Baby Formula], FAZHI RIBAO (法制日报) [LEGAL DAILY],
(Sept. 26, 2008), http://health.sohu.com/20080926/n259756850.shtml; Zhongguo
Jingying Wang (中国经营网) [China Business Network], Sanjuqingan 10 Nian
Naiye Xipai He Jiannan de Xinxin Chongjian (三聚氰胺 10 年奶业洗牌和艰难的
信心重建) [10 Years After Melamine Dairy Industry Reshuffled and Confidence
Reconstruction Difficult], XINGLANG CAIJING (新浪财经) [SINA FIN.] (May 20,
2018), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2018-05-20/doc-ihaturft0803202.shtm
l.
232 See Heilongjiang Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Jiakuai Xiandai Xumu Chanye
Fazhan de Yijian (黑龙江省人民政府关于加快现代畜牧产业发展的意见 )
[Opinions of the People’s Government of Heilongjiang Province on Accelerating
the Development of Modern Livestock Industry], HEILONGJIANG SHENG RENMIN
ZHENGFU (黑龙江省人民政府) [HEILONGJIANG PROVINCE PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT]
(Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.hlj.gov.cn/wjfg/system/2015/10/21/010745457.shtml
(providing the provincial government’s dairy strategy in Heilongjiang Provincial
People’s Government).
230
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below a certain level, farmers would also receive a small subsidy
from the administration. In addition, farmers could get easy access
to veterinary services and free immunizations for their cows. On the
other hand, the District administration prohibited free grazing
(purportedly to protect wetlands and mitigate soil erosion) and made
it virtually impossible for farmers who refused to move their cows to
a compound to sell their milk.233 By April 2015, 90% of the cows in
River District had been moved to these compounds.
Dairy farmers had mixed feelings about joining the
compounds. Farmers, most of whom were in their late forties or
fifties, welcomed the 50% reduction of labor in cow raising and the
disappearance of filth and stench from their own yards. They also
welcomed the easy access to medicine and veterinary services.
However, they had mixed views about disease outbreaks and drug
use. Some farmers complained that concentrated raising facilitated
the spread of viruses and illnesses, and, as a result, more drugs had
to be used on the cows. This not only increased the costs of
production but also gave Wonderson an excuse to reject their milk.
On the other hand, some farmers pointed out that before compound
raising, irresponsible farmers would secretly give excessive doses of
drugs to the cows, causing companies to reject an entire truckload of
milk and leaving other farmers unpaid. Concentrated raising
prevented such pernicious practices, as drugs were now administered
by the compound staff.
The biggest complaint, however, was the exponentially
higher cost of feed. The compound management constantly
pressured farmers to adopt a total mixed ration (“TMR”) feed plan,
alleging that it could maximize milk production.234 Yet, adopting a
TMR plan would mean that farmers had to buy feed from other
sources, such as alfalfa from the U.S. or cornmeal from Kuwait.
Since such large purchases were made by State Farms, many farmers
suspected that State Farms had “jacked up the prices” of imported
feed and “taken all the profits” from dairy farming.
ii. Establish Corporate Dairy Farms
A precondition for Wonderson to build a dairy processing
plant in River District was a reliable, easily adjustable raw milk
233

See infra Section IV.C.iv.
TMR is the acronym for “total mixed ration.” It is the most common method in
the U.S. for feeding cows that cannot freely graze on pasturelands. David J.
Schingoethe, A 100-Year Review: Total Mixed Ration Feeding of Dairy Cows, 100
J. DAIRY SCI. 10143, 10143 (2017).
234
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supply. However, River District’s remote location makes it an
unattractive place for private investors. Realizing this difficulty, the
District chief—an ambitious politician known for his “dictatorial”
manner of governance (and later for convicted corruption)—forced
Farm administrations to establish corporate dairy farms and required
all Farm employees to invest in these companies as shareholders.
The particular way in which these corporate farms were
established determined their ownership and governance structures.
The farms were managed by people who had been officials of the
State Farm system and who, if circumstances required or permitted,
could return to the administration as officials again. In that regard,
these farms were de-facto state-run enterprises. However, the
shareholders were not the state but State Farm employees. Hence, in
terms of property rights, these farms were privately owned
companies.
Visually, corporate dairy farms looked impressive. They
had large, new buildings, highly mechanized operations, and
professional management. However, both the shareholders and the
management personnel I talked to expressed concerns about the
farms’ economic viability. Shareholders complained about a classic
principal-agent problem. The managers were experts in dairying, but
they owned no shares in the company and had weak financial
incentives to run the farms efficiently. The shareholders had a direct
financial stake in the company, but they knew nothing about dairying
and, as a result, could not exert real supervision over the managers.
Managers blamed the lack of profitability on the FTAs that
China signed with dairy-exporting countries and on China’s WTO
trade concessions. Given that River District is far away from cities
with vibrant economies, milk produced in River District was used
predominantly to produce milk powder—a product facing the
toughest competition from foreign producers due to its easy
transportability and long shelf life.235 Technicians of corporate dairy
farms complained that the administration invested too little in
technology. Farms lacked expertise in maintaining mechanized
milking stations, young corn fermentation, and manure treatment.
Many practices were inhumane to the cows. Many sheds
lacked dry beds for the cows to rest or sleep on. The shed floors were
bare concrete with no soft padding and were wet from the water hose
According to the Chinese government’s statistics, the average price of raw milk
in 2015 in major exporting countries was 60% that in China. 2014-2015 DAIRY
INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT STUDY, supra note 223, at 12.
235
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(for getting rid of urine and mature). During the long winter months,
cows were not allowed to go outside. Staff members told me that
when they opened the gates in the morning, the stench was so
overpowering that it made them sick.
iii. Subsidize Breed Improvement, Dairy Insurance, and
Feed Crop Production
In the wake of the Sino-New Zealand FTA, the District
administration ventured to New Zealand and bought nearly twenty
thousand high-productivity calves.236 The calves were then sold at a
subsidized rate, mostly to members of newly established dairy
corporations (on one State Farm, the subsidy rate was 67%). New
Zealand cows aside, the District administration also subsidized
purchases of domestically-produced Holstein cows (on one State
Farm, the subsidy rate was 50%). These subsidies seemed to have
ended by the time I began fieldwork in River District in May 2015
and were replaced with guaranteed bank loans. Dairy farmers were
also guaranteed a certain acreage of land for growing young corn and
alfalfa.
The project of increasing the size and quality of cow stock
in River District was far from smooth. Initially, New Zealand cows
were placed in the same sheds as local cows. The mixing of the
breeds led to an outbreak of brucellosis—a highly contagious
bacterial infection—among New Zealand cows. Hundreds of cows
had to be slaughtered and buried deep underground. Insurance
covered part of the losses; the rest was borne by dairy farmers and
shareholders of corporate farms. I was also told anecdotally that not
all cows infected with brucellosis were slaughtered and that in some
cases, dairy farmers sold them to slaughterhouses to be finally sold
as cheap beef to unknowing consumers. After the epidemic ended,
dairy farms separated New Zealand cows from local cows. By the
time I arrived in River District in 2015, all New Zealand cows were
raised on corporate dairy farms in enclosed sheds and fenced-in,
open-air grounds.

236

I was told by a District official anecdotally that Chinese buyers (both state and
private) had exhausted the local calf supply and their partners could deliver only ten
thousand calves after the signing of the contract.
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iv. Induce Wonderson to Build a Plant by Granting It
Subsidy and Monopsony to Buy Local Milk
The District administration negotiated a development
agreement with the Wonderson Group. Wonderson would build a
baby formula manufacturing plant in River District that, according to
the District administration, would “provide jobs for 10,000 dairy
farmers, diversify the local economy, and be a major taxpayer to the
District.” The Provincial and District administrations would
subsidize part of the construction. To guarantee a steady supply of
safe milk for the plant, the District administration also granted
Wonderson a monopsony to purchase local milk.
The plant was built in 2013, but it did not open until late
2015 due to fierce competition and weak sales nationally. In the
interim, Wonderson purchased milk from River District to be
processed by its plants in other parts of Heilongjiang.
The magnitude of Wonderson’s market power was
astonishing. To reduce transportation costs, Wonderson decided to
send milk trucks only to stations with a specific minimum production
volume. The District administration capitulated and closed down
nearly half of its newly constructed compounds, forcing farmers to
move to larger compounds.
As a monopsony, Wonderson could reject or suppress the
price of a particular truckload of milk based on “excessive levels of
antibiotics or other drugs.” Talking with managers from large
corporate dairy farms and a medium-sized, privately-owned-and-run
dairy processing company, I learned that there would almost always
be some level of antibiotics in a truckload of raw milk. Given that
the test was conducted by Wonderson, it had the power to decide
whether to reject a truckload of milk or lower the price. In the
context of national competition and local monopsony, raw milk
prices plummeted from ¥5-6/kg in 2013 to ¥3/kg in 2015.
v. Push Out Small Dairy Farmers
Whether by design or by disaster, River District’s dairy
strategy—in the global and national market contexts—pushed out
River District’s small dairy farmers. The displacement took ten years
and multiple steps to complete.
The first wave of exits took place when farmers were
pressured to enter the newly constructed dairy compounds. Rural
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neighborhoods in River District were tens of kilometers apart from
each other. The District administration did not build compounds in
neighborhoods with a small cow stock. Farmers from these
neighborhoods had to move their cows to neighborhoods that had a
compound. The move was impractical for many and inconvenient
for most dairy farmers. Many of them were not full-time dairy
farmers. Instead, the husband and wife team raised cows and grew
soybeans and corn; the wife did most of the cow rearing, and the
husband did most of the crop cultivation. Moving to a cow
compound in another neighborhood would mean husband-wife
separation and an inability to help each other with housework or with
dairy or crop production during busy times of the day or year. Facing
these difficulties, some farmers sold their cows and exited dairy
production. The same happened again when Wonderson refused to
collect milk from small compounds, and the administration had to
shut them down.
A significant number of farmers exited dairy production
between 2013 and 2015, before Wonderson opened its processing
plant in River District. The rising costs of feed, the declining prices
of raw milk, Wonderson’s monopsony, and the uncertainty as to
when Wonderson would open its plant in River District pressured
dairy farmers to mitigate losses. Some farmers reduced the number
of lactating cows or the food supply for non-lactating cows (which,
needlessly to say, was an inhumane practice). Some sold part of their
stock to other farmers or to slaughterhouses. Some switched to calf
breeding. When farmers could no longer hold out, they sold all of
their stock and exited dairy production.
Contrary to local expectations, Wonderson’s opening of the
dairy processing plant provided little relief to small dairy farmers in
River District. In a conversation with a key interlocutor in 2019, I
learned that Wonderson could not compete with other infant formula
brands on the national market, and due to poor sales,237 the plant in
River District only accepted the “best” milk—milk produced by New
Zealand cows owned by large-scale corporate farms.
Recalling the “10,000 dairy jobs” promised by Wonderson
and the River District administration, I asked my interlocutor what
had happened to farmers who were raising cows in the compounds.
He replied that most of them had sold their cows, left home, and were
237

For example, in 2016 Wyeth sold three times and Danone sold four times as
much baby formula as Wonderson by revenue in China. Wang Guang & Feng Qi,
supra note 219, at 8.
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working in big cities as migrant workers, and that others had
switched to raising beef cattle or hogs. “No one raises [dairy cows]
any more. It’s all mechanized ( 没人养了，全是机械化),” he
remarked.238
***
From a strictly legal perspective, the fate of dairy and
soybean farmers in post-WTO China is a combined result of
international economic law and domestic property law. China joined
the WTO in pursuit of economic betterment. However, the
international economic regime also exposed Chinese farmers to
unmitigated competition from larger-scale, well subsidized, and
predominantly Western producers. China’s HRS, which had created
and benefited hundreds of millions of independent farmers decades
earlier, also created dooming structural disadvantages for these very
same farmers: the diseconomy of small scale and no access to landbased financing. Just as it redesigned the Maoist property system to
increase farm productivity in the early reform era, the Chinese state
is redesigning HRS to increase farm productivity in the age of global
competition. This time, however, the goal is to get big again, by
eliminating (rather than creating) hundreds of millions of small
farmers.
As Chinese property law evolves, the backbone agricultural
producer shifts from a public farming bureaucracy (the Mao era), to
a private farming family (1980-), and now increasingly to a corporate
farming enterprise. It would be a mistake to think that the transition
from the farming family to the farming enterprise naturally flows
from a change in property law. The Chinese government is adopting
an active, paternalistic, and at times outright coercive industrial
policy to facilitate this transition. To the extent the fieldwork is
illustrative, the local iterations of this policy in Mountain County and
River District reveal a clear if blunt contrast: Where there are more
trade-inflicted agricultural job losses, there is more drastic, statist,
and paternalistic industrial policy.
V. The Social Costs of Globalization and the Hardening
of Chinese Authoritarianism
The current international economic system was created at a
time of high optimism about market-centered economic
development. The beliefs of the day were that competition can make
238

Xiaoqian Hu, Fieldwork Journal 2019-005 (on file with author).
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the economic pie bigger, 239 trade-inflicted job losses are
“transitional,”240 and “the poor as a class will improve” from the
cheaper goods and new jobs brought by free (or freer) trade. 241
Meanwhile, critics have argued that this system traps workers and
developing countries in “a race to the bottom”;242 brews discontents
across the globe; 243 benefits corporate elites at the expense of the
working and middle classes;244 and, in Western liberal democracies,
violates the government-citizen compact that increased trade
opening should be accompanied with increased social protection of
domestic constituencies from trade-inflicted disruptions. 245 Since
2016, scholars have revealed how flawed political representation and
uneven distribution of costs and benefits under the current economic
system have contributed to the global rise of authoritarianism,
protectionism, and populism.246
China is experiencing a rise in authoritarianism too, despite
being an authoritarian regime at the outset of the change. Since
taking office in 2012, Xi Jinping has radically expanded his power
as General Secretary of the CCP and has tightened the CCP’s grip on
the country’s political, economic, and cultural institutions.247 More
239

Geoffrey J. Bannister & Kamau Thugge, International Trade and Poverty
Alleviation (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 01/54, 2001); DEEPAK LAL,
REVIVING THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 84, 86 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006).
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245
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246 See generally PAUL J.J. WELFENS, THE GLOBAL TRUMP: STRUCTURAL US
POPULISM AND ECONOMIC CONFLICTS WITH EUROPE AND ASIA (Palgrave Macmillan
2019); see generally WORLD TRADE & INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED, supra note
15; DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE: IDEAS FOR A SANE WORLD ECONOMY
1–8 (Princeton Univ. Press 2018); STIGLITZ, supra note 15, at xvii–xxxiii; LOKA
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specifically, Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign, which
allegedly had investigated 2.7 million officials and punished 1.5
million by late 2018.248 Xi expanded state control and regulation
over market activities and heightened government support of SOEs
and other Chinese enterprises in an effort to promote “national
champions” (globally competitive Chinese firms).249 In 2018, the
National People’s Congress amended the Constitution to enshrine
“Xi Jinping thought” (Xi Jinping sixiang, “习近平思想”), further
solidify the Party’s leadership, abolish presidential and vice
presidential term limits, and create the National Supervision
Commission as the sixth branch of government.250 Analyses outside
China have largely interpreted these events as political and legal
moves by an authoritarian party-state to control increasingly
uncontrollable factionalism and diverse social problems.251
When globalization is discussed, China is portrayed as a big
winner from the current international economic system and as using
its economic prowess to assert stronger global influence.252 While
globalization has indeed brought enormous benefits to the Chinese
MONITOR (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.prcleader.org/carl-minzner (tightening
intellectual and educational control); see also Austin Ramzy, President Xi Jinping’s
Rise in China, as Covered by The Times, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-career-highlights.html
(providing a comprehensive summary).
248 Gerry Shih, In China, Investigations and Purges Become the New Normal, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_p
acific/in-china-investigations-and-purges-become-the-new-normal/2018/10/21/077
fa736-d39c-11e8-a275-81c671a50422_story.html. Western observers interpret
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as at least in part Xi’s pretext to purge his political
enemies. See, e.g., id; Charting China’s ‘Great Purge’ Under Xi, BBC NEWS (Oct.
23, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162. Pretext or not,
the anti-corruption campaign did lead to the further concentration of power in Xi’s
hands.
249 RAN LI & KEE CHEOK CHEONG, CHINA’S STATE ENTERPRISES: CHANGING ROLE
IN A RAPIDLY TRANSFORMING ECONOMY 1–5, 52–57 (Palgrave Macmillan 2019);
ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI JINPING AND THE NEW
CHINESE STATE 4–5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2018); Mark Wu, The ‘China, Inc.’
Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 261, 281–82 (2016).
250 XIANFA arts.36–37, 41–50, 123–27 (2018).
251 Compare MINZNER, supra note 14, at 8, 36, 86 (describing the CCP as a frozen
regime undergoing internal decay), with Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, China’s
Turn Toward Law, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 281–82 (2019) (describing the CCP as
actively using law to enhance its governance effectiveness), and Donald Clarke,
China’s Legal Non-Construction Project, paper presented at China’s Legal
Construction Program at 40 years: Towards an Autonomous Legal System?,
Michigan Law School, (Oct. 11-13, 2019) (on file with author) (interpreting China’s
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population as a whole, it has also caused agricultural job losses and
systemic social dislocation in rural China. The magnitude of the
social costs of globalization connects China’s recent political
changes with the recent political changes around the world, and
compels us to scrutinize China’s changes in a global light.
A. The Social Costs of Globalization
Milk and soybeans are microcosms of China’s agriculture.
At the time that China joined the WTO, Long Yongtu—the official
who led China’s accession negotiations—admitted that “agriculture
would be the most vulnerable and therefore the most exposed to
massive import competition”; and that “more than 9 million to 20
million farmers would lose their jobs.”253 Hindsight suggests that
Long’s estimate was overly optimistic. In 2001, 364 million Chinese
people worked in agriculture.254 In 2017, only 209 million worked
in agriculture—a decrease of 155 million jobs. 255 The Chinese
government interprets these numbers as success stories of
industrialization and urbanization. 256 Yet, such interpretation
glosses over the hardships of the dislocation and adjustment of those
undergoing the “transition.”257
Between 2001 and 2015, the share of agricultural exports in
China’s total exports declined by nearly 50%, while the share of
253

Long Yongtu, China: The Implications and Key Lessons Learned Through WTO
Accession, in EAST ASIAN VISIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 178,
183–84 (Indermit Gill et al. eds., 2002).
254 China Statistical Yearbook 2018: 4-2 Number of Employed Persons at Year-End
by Three Strata of Industry, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2020).
255 Id.
256 See e.g., 2018 Nian Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Tongji Gongbao (2018 年
国 民 经 济 和 社 会 发 展 统 计 公 报 ) [2018 Annual Public Report on China’s
Economic and Social Development Statistics], ZHONGGUO GUOJIA TONGJI JU (中国
国 家 统 计 局 ) [NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA] (Feb. 28, 2019),
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zaxfb/201902/t20190228_1651265.html.
257 Literature on hardships of migrant workers and their families and on community
disintegration in rural China abounds. See, e.g., ARIANNE M. GAETANO, OUT TO
WORK: MIGRATION, GENDER, AND THE CHANGING LIVES OF RURAL WOMEN IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 3–6 (Univ. of Haw. Press 2015); Hongsong Liang et al.,
Liushou Women’s Happiness and Its Influencing Factors in Rural China, 117 SOC.
INDICATORS RES. 907, 914–15 (2014); Yuying Tong et al., The Association Between
Parental Migration and Childhood Illness in Rural China, 31 EUROPEAN J.
POPULATION 561, 562 (2015); Ye Jingzhong, Left-Behind Children: The Social
Practice of China’s Economic Boom, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 613, 613 (2011); Ye
Jingzhong & Pan Lu, Differentiated Childhoods: Impacts of Rural Labor Migration
on Left-Behind Children in China, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 355, 355 (2011); DOROTHY
J. SOLINGER, CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP IN URBAN CHINA: PEASANT MIGRANTS, THE
STATE, AND THE LOGIC OF THE MARKET 1–4 (Univ. of Ca. Press 1999).
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agricultural imports increased by over 50%. 258 During the same
period, China’s agricultural trade balance changed from a small
surplus of $1.7 billion to a large deficit of $52.6 billion.259 Today,
despite the U.S.-China trade war, for every dollar China gains from
agricultural exports, it loses 1.7 dollars from agricultural imports.260
The soybean and dairy sectors epitomize trade-inflicted
market competition, job losses, and social disruptions in rural China.
Despite a surge (and, in the case of soybeans, a dramatic surge) in
demand, domestic production of both products decreased.261 Small
Chinese farmers lost the competition to larger foreign producers and
were forced to exit from production.262 The Chinese state’s strategy
of scaling up, mechanizing, and corporatizing the agricultural sector
accelerates the process of dislocation and displacement.263 If China
had between thirty-one million and fifty-four million soybean
farmers, market forces and government policy have pushed the vast
majority of them off of the land and into the cities. If the estimate is
correct that for every ten thousand tons of milk powder imported,
thirty-four thousand Chinese dairy jobs are displaced, then in 2018,
China’s imports of milk powder alone had a replacement effect of
3.8 million dairy jobs.264
Lenka Fojtikova, China’s Trade Competitiveness in the Area of Agricultural
Products After the Implementation of the World Trade Organization Commitments,
64 AGRIC. ECON–CZECH 379, 384 (2018).
259 Id. at 383.
260 See 2018 Nian Woguo Nongchanpin Jinchukou Qingkuang (2018 年我国农产
品进出口情况) [Information Regarding China’s Agricultural Imports and Exports
for the Year 2018], ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO NONGYE NONGCUN BU (中华人
民共和国农业农村部) [MINISTRY OF AGRIC. AND RURAL AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Feb. 2, 2019), http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztzl/nybrl/rlxx/201902/
t20190201_6171079.htm.
261 Hallie Gu & Shivani Singh, China’s December Soybean Imports Surge On Year
as Cargoes Clear Customs, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/articl
e/us-china-economy-trade-soybeans/chinas-december-soybean-imports-surge-on-y
ear-as-cargoes-clear-customs-idUSKBN1ZD0C2.
262 See supra Section III. See also John Vidal, Corporate Stranglehold of Farmland
a Risk to World Food Security, Study Says, GUARDIAN (May 28, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/may/28/farmland-food-security-s
mall-farmers.
263 See supra Section IV.C. See also Qian Forrest Zhang, Class Differentiation in
Rural China: Dynamics of Accumulation, Commodification, and State Intervention,
15 AGRARIAN CHANGE 338, 339 (2015).
264 Wang Yuting (王玉庭) & Du Xinwei (杜欣蔚), Ruzhipin Jinkou Dui Zhongguo
Naiye de Yingxiang ji Fazhan Silu (乳制品进口对中国奶业的影响及发展思路)
[The Impact of Dairy Imports on China’s Dairy and Thoughts on Pathways for
Development], 11 NONGYE ZHANWANG (农业展望) [AGRIC. OUTLOOK] 96, 99 (2018)
(citation omitted); Aozhou Caijing Jianwen (澳洲财经见闻) [Australian Finance
News], 2018 Nian Zhongguo Jinkou Ganru Zhipin Baochi Zengzhang (2018 年中
国进口干乳制品保持增长) [China’s Imports of Dry Dairy Products Maintained
Growth in 2018], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO SHANGWU BU (中华人民共和
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Mountain County and River District illustrate these
profound socioeconomic changes. Mountain County has switched
from a predominantly agricultural economy to a labor exporter for
Chinese cities. River District has seen its agriculture completely
scaled up and the overwhelming majority of the labor force pushed
out of agriculture, and it, too, has become a labor exporter for
Chinese cities.
The rural-to-urban migration has been interpreted in China
as a successful implementation of a Lewisian model of development
(transferring excess rural labor to urban industries to achieve
economic takeoff). 265 However, not all ex-farmers are able to
transition from farming to an urban or industrial job. Many exfarmers in River District cannot find jobs in the city due to older age,
poor health, lack of education, or care responsibilities at home. Their
lives are precarious and heavily depend on access to poverty relief,
free or subsidized healthcare, and educational support for their
children. Given China’s size, nationally, the population of farmers
who cannot make this transition can be large.
B. The Hardening of Chinese Authoritarianism
While doing fieldwork, I observed a counterintuitive
phenomenon in both Mountain County and River District. The
central Chinese government enjoyed higher and more unequivocal
approval among the less well-off residents than among the more
resourceful and politically more connected residents. The former
group expressed stronger support for Xi’s anti-corruption and antipoverty campaigns, and for the government’s construction of rural
infrastructure and establishment of rural social programs. The latter
group—despite being the bigger beneficiary of China’s economic
growth—was much more skeptical, and cynical, of these government
initiatives. They were much more likely to view these initiatives as
bureaucratic squandering of public resources, or as breeding grounds
for corruption and favoritism (even if they were beneficiaries of
corruption and favoritism in these and other contexts). On average,
the former group consisted of the vast majority of farmers and exfarmers, while the latter group was made up of the emerging urban
middle class and the lucky few ex-farmers who managed to become
non-farming entrepreneurs.
国商务部) [MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Mar. 6,
2019), http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/l/201903/20190302840591.shtml.
265 JUSTIN YIFU LIN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE ECONOMY 166–68 (2012); see, e.g.,
W.A. LEWIS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH UNLIMITED SUPPLIES OF LABOUR
(1954).
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I interpret the former group’s higher respect for Xi Jinping’s
government to three potential factors. First, a more pro-rural
governance policy. 266 Prior to the mid-2000s the Chinese
government had been extracting wealth and resources from rural
areas to fund urban industrialization; starting from the mid-2000s,
the policy has been that “industry recompenses agriculture, cities
support villages.” 267 The shift is reflected in the Chinese
government’s abolition of agricultural taxes,268 construction of rural
266

Readers may ask: Why would an authoritarian government care about the
hardships of people who are economically precarious and politically unrepresented
and unorganized? A few factors may shed some light on this question. First, even
an authoritarian government has to address acute social problems as problems of
governance. See TO GOVERN CHINA: EVOLVING PRACTICES OF POWER 1–3 (Vivienne
Shue & Patricia M. Thornton eds., 2017) (providing a recent, excellent collection of
studies analyzing China’s governance challenges and practices). Second, greater
power comes with greater responsibility and citizen expectations. Failing to address
acute social problems might provide a fertile ground for political dissents to mobilize
discontented rural citizens and eventually overthrow the CCP, which was exactly
how the CCP—an informal group of thirteen men in 1921—managed to overthrow
the Nationalist government in a matter of twenty-eight years. Even if the CCP had
the wherewithal to suppress all insurgencies, it might be cheaper, and certainly
would make the CCP look more benevolent, to address social problems in the first
place. Third, the CCP’s goal of national rejuvenation rises and falls on the fate of
the rural population. Failure to address rural suffering undermines the CCP’s stated
goal as well as its governing competence in the eyes of the urban middle class, who
have family ties with rural China. Lastly, there is a body of scholarship that affirms
and seeks to explain the existence of, and the CCP’s support for, some form of
government accountability or responsiveness in China. Elizabeth J. Perry, Chinese
Conceptions of “Rights”: From Mencius to Mao – and Now, 6 PERSP. POL. 37, 37–
38 (2008) (traditional Chinese moral and political economy); Elizabeth J. Perry, The
Populist Dream of Chinese Democracy, 74 J. ASIAN STUD. 903, 904 (2015) (populist
Party and public conceptions of “Chinese democracy”); LILY L. TSAI,
ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: SOLIDARY GROUPS AND PUBLIC GOODS
PROVISION IN RURAL CHINA 288–89 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (socially
embedded, local mechanisms of accountability); Alex L. Wang, The Search for
Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 382–85 (2013) (institutionalized, administrative structures);
CHRISTOPHER HEURLIN, RESPONSIVE AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA: LAND, PROTESTS,
AND POLICY MAKING 56–57, 61, 78–83 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016) (societypropelled legal changes).
267 Han Jun (韩俊), Gongye Fanbu Nongye Chengshi Zhichi Nongcun—Ruhe Zai
Xin Xingshi Xia Geng Duo Di Zhichi Nongye He Nongcun Fazhan (工业反哺农业，
城市支持农村－如何在新形势下更多地支持农业和农村发展) [Industry Feeds
Agriculture Cities Support Rural Areas—How to Support Agricultural and Rural
Development More in the New Situation], RENMIN WANG (人民网 ) [PEOPLE’S
DAILY] (Nov. 18, 2005), http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1037/3867779.html. See
also the increase in China’s annual budget for agricultural and rural affairs from
2001 to 2016, 2017 CHINA AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK, supra note 211, at 137; CHINA
AGRICULTURE YEARBOOK 100 (2002).
268
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Feizhi
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongyeshui Tiaoli de Jueding (全国人民代表大会
常务委员会关于废止《中华人民共和国农业税条例》的决定) [Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the Abolition of the
Agricultural Tax Regulations of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
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and agricultural infrastructure,269 subsidization of agriculture,270 and
establishment of a rudimentary rural social protection system.271 All
of these rural economic and social programs are concrete measures
to implement Xi’s anti-poverty campaign, which targets rural and
impoverished areas in central and western China and vows to
eradicate poverty in China by 2020.272
Second, a potential, and certainly implicit, alliance between
Xi Jinping and a rural base that is victimized or marginalized by the
prevailing legal-economic order and that desires “a national hero” to
fight the rich and the corrupt, provide for the poor, and “right the
wrongs” of global capitalism. 273 This alliance does not require a
systematic discourse against globalization within the rural base. The
hardships the base has suffered may make it receptive to—and even
positively demand—state protection, paternalism, and redistribution
of wealth from the elites to the masses. Nor does this alliance require
everyone to believe that the leader is faithfully delivering protection,
paternalism, and wealth redistribution. As long as enough people in
the base believe or are induced to believe that some degree of
protection, paternalism, and wealth redistribution is being delivered,
the alliance may be sustained. In Mountain County and River
District, a significant number of residents could point to the tangible
the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2005, effective Jan. 1,
2006) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Feb. 28, 2006, at 6.
269 See e.g., Guojia Nongye Zonghe Kaifa Bangongshi 2014 Nian Gongzuo Zongjie
(国家农业综合开发办公室 2014 年工作总结) [Work Summary of National
Agricultural Comprehensive Development Office in 2014], ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO CAIZHENG BU (中华人民共和国财政部) [MINISTRY OF FIN. OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], http://xm.mof.gov.cn/mofhome/guojianongcunzong
hekaifa/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201503/t20150317_1203249.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
270 See supra text accompanying notes 206−11.
271 LING ZHU, FOOD SECURITY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR THE RURAL POOR IN
CHINA 19–21 (Routledge 2017) (poverty relief, food assistance, reemployment
initiatives, old age security for landless farmers, pension program for rural migrant
workers); ARMIN MÜLLER, CHINA’S NEW PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE: CHALLENGES
TO HEALTH REFORMS AND THE NEW RURAL CO-OPERATIVE MEDICAL SYSTEM 2–4
(Routledge 2017) (rural healthcare).
272 Juesheng Guantou, Kan Xi Jinping Zhe Yinian Fupin Gongjian Lu (决胜关头，
看习近平这一年扶贫攻坚路) [At the Juncture of Victory, Look at Xi Jinping’s
Arduous Path of Fighting Poverty This Year], YANGSHI (央视) [CCTV] (Oct. 17,
2019), http://m.news.cctv.com/2019/10/17/ARTIZHE57BNZTsyEo8pIVE5N1910
17.shtml.
273 Cf. SIMEON DJANKOV, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON., RUSSIA’S ECONOMY UNDER
PUTIN: FROM CRONY CAPITALISM TO STATE CAPITALISM 2–3 (2015) (explaining that
the shock therapy and rapid privatization under the Washington Consensus led to
crony capitalism and a weakened and impoverished Russian state; discontented and
disillusioned public demanded a strong leader to check crony capitalism, regain
economic stability, rebuild state capacity, and provide social welfare).
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benefits they had received from the government and conclude that Xi
Jinping was “a good leader.”
Third, a paternalistic agricultural policy to address job
losses, social dislocation, and rural decline. The state’s role in
Mountain County’s agricultural economy is an example of a milder,
more benign version of state paternalism. The state’s role in River
District’s agricultural economy is an example of a stronger and more
dictatorial version of state paternalism, indistinguishable from state
coercion. Yet, even in River District, the magnitude of tradeinflicted harm, the provision of a basic income through
cooperatization, and the establishment by the State Farm system of
an elemental safety net allowed the local government to coerce an
entire population without causing a popular uprising.
***
In the West, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and promotion of
national champions have attracted much attention (and suspicion and
criticism). Yet, his anti-poverty campaign and paternalist approach
to rural and agricultural development remain largely unknown. The
fieldwork in Mountain County and River District is a deep probe on
an extremely limited scale of the relationship between the Chinese
state and rural Chinese citizens. To the extent it can shed light on
state-citizen relations in rural China, it may be the potential
connection between the costs of globalization and a turn away from
neoliberalism as embodied in the international economic order. The
job losses and social dislocation in some parts of rural China may be
creating a welcoming environment for state protection and
paternalism and for a political strongman in defiance of Western,
particularly American, neoliberalism.274
VI. Conclusion
DuPuis exclaims that “milk is an embodiment of the politics
of American identity over the last 150 years.”275 The same can be
said about the significance of milk in the collective Chinese
imagination. The American identity is shaped by America’s selfimage “as a leading voice against authoritarianism.”276 Similarly, the
core of the modern Chinese identity is shaped by its understanding
274

David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism,
77 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (2014) (explaining the hegemony of neoliberalism in
contemporary Western democracies, particularly the U.S.).
275 DUPUIS, supra note 31, at 8.
276 Mark Jia, Illiberal Law in American Courts, U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 47 (forthcoming
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3426223.
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of the West during the two Sino-West encounters, one in the late
Qing and Republican periods, and one in the reform era.
Milk is a product of the first Sino-West encounter. The
subsequent social history of milk in China is a live drama of all the
conflicts, aspirations, ambivalences, and uncertainties that the SinoWest encounters entail. Unfortunately, in neither encounter did the
West present itself in the best light. The first encounter left the
Chinese with a bitter collective memory of imperialism and
colonialism. The second encounter, which is still ongoing today,
may be making an impression on a significant portion of the Chinese
public—and I truly hope I am wrong—that Western liberalism is
essentially anti-collective, anti-state, and anti-redistributive market
fundamentalism.277
China has embraced milk. The world has embraced soy. In
the age of post-neoliberalism (if there will be one), milk and soy will
continue to embody the complexity of national identities, the interconnectedness between nations and peoples, and all the benefits and
costs, and promises and disappointments that may come with that
inter-connectedness.
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How the Chinese public perceives the West is a combined result of Western
actions and Chinese interpretations, heavily filtered and shaped by the Chinese
government under the leadership of the CCP. Despite the heavy influence of the
CCP, the West, through its policies, actions, and repertoire, is an active shaper of its
image in China. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 274, at 6−7 (explaining
neoliberalism’s argumentative repertoire and hegemonic power in the West); Amy
Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 131 (2014)
(exposing the pervasiveness of a negative neoliberal conception of the state in the
field of intellectual property law); John Williamson, The Washington Consensus as
Policy Prescription for Development, lecture delivered at the World Bank (Jan. 13,
2004), https://www.piie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf (explaining
the policy prescriptions that make up the Washington Census, the quintessence of
neoliberalism in international development circles).

